




POLICY BRIEF

Berlin Process: Path to Europe or to nowhere?



Publisher: Kosovar Center for Security Studies

Author: Donika Emini

Research Assistant: Tomas Romero Batista

Internal review: Florian Qehaja



© All rights reserved by the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Intellectual property rights are protected by Law on copyright and related rights.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. Use for commercial purposes of all reports published by the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is not permitted without the written consent of the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. Please contact: info@qkss.org or +381 38221420

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Table of content

Key Findings	4
Background	5
The Berlin Process, a new chapter for regional cooperation?	6
Regional Commitment to Solving Bilateral Disputes	7
Previous attempts to resolve the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia	8
Kosovo in between the Albanian – Serbian relations	10
Conclusions and Key Recommendations	11
Annexes	12
Declaration on Bilateral Issues (Vienna Summit)	12
Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation of Kosovo	12
Bibliography	13

Key Findings

- Berlin Process is taking place at the moment to guarantee regional development and cooperation envisaging a future European Union (EU) membership for the Western Balkans. The process aims to fill the enlargement fatigue created as a result of some EU official statements no further enlargement over the next years;
- Berlin Process has been initiated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 and it includes twelve states: six Western Balkan states which are at the different stages in their EU integration process (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and six EU members states (Austria, Croatia France, Germany, Italy and Slovenia);
- Resolution of bilateral disputes represents a large portion of the Berlin process, by focusing into remaining open bilateral issues and some potential expected to derive mostly with border demarcations;
- The efforts to resolve bilateral disputes took shape during the Vienna Summit with the launch of the joint declaration on bilateral issues. However, the lack of implementation or monitoring mechanism that will ensure implementation of the commitments made during this process can pose a serious challenge for the entire process. Potential decrease of attention, namely by Germany, would mark the Berlin Process of “just another initiative” without tangible results;
- While there was no overlap with the Kosovo- Serbia dialogue in resolving one of the most challenging bilateral dispute in the region, the Berlin Process saw a new strategic approach to the issue by highlighting the Albanian- Serbian relations, by sidelining Kosovo as the “elephant in the room” with respect to Albanian-Serbian relations;
- Berlin Process gives more prominence, at least nominally, towards Albanian and Serbian leaders while no clear objective is seen to be focused in solving the remaining obstacles with respect to Kosovo’s statehood, dysfunctional Bosnia and Herzegovina and political impasse in Macedonia;

Background

With the accession of Croatia to the EU in 2013, the Balkans became the next stop for the widening process of European integration. Countries in the region like Montenegro and Serbia are well on their way to ascension while Albania and Macedonia have been recognized as candidates. Bosnia and Herzegovina has already submitted application and Kosovo is regarded as a potential candidate, although facing major political challenges mainly due to lack of recognition by all EU member states (Žornaczuk 2016: 2-6).

Extending the boundaries of the EU towards the WB countries has meant the accession of states with more fragile economies and disputed territories and Brussels seems to favor resolving bilateral issues yet, keeping the open door policies for all countries in the region (Geddes & Taylor, 2015: 4-18). In order to fill this enlargement fatigue, EU has introduced the so-called Berlin Process. This process aims to promote regional cooperation and projects, solve bilateral disputes in the region and ensure EU perspective for all WB countries (Jackson, 2015: 112).

The overall relations between the WB countries with the EU neighbors have been solid due to the emphasis that the EU accession framework on regional cooperation and good neighborly relations (EU Enlargement Strategy, 2015). However, the struggle to push toward deeper regional cooperation within the WB countries seems to lack success as the bilateral disputes in the region are seriously disrupting the EU integration process. Henceforth, solving bilateral disputes - mainly border and political - are becoming key factors in EU membership process and conditionality, with some even overshadowing the internal reforms and democratization of the country. The existing bilateral disputes, some open and some potential – as the process of demarcation between the WB countries could generate border disputes – has pushed the EU to take measures to prevent issues that would renew instability in the region. Moreover, the inability to solve such disputes, in addition to creating instability, will pose a serious challenge in the internal reforming process result-

ing in delays in the EU integration process (Necsev, et al., 2016).

The persistent approach that the EU has taken into solving bilateral disputes shows that: First, there is a great interest to integrate a stable and prosperous region into the EU. Second, it shows the determination to gain credibility - among member states – to its commitment in promoting stability in the region. Third, the lessons learned from previous cases such as the Cyprus dispute, a frozen conflict rather difficult to tackle by the EU without the “membership” conditionality that would serve as a catalyst for a settlement. On the other hand the case of EU membership of Romania and Bulgaria for political reasons without fulfilling the membership criteria shows that almost a decade later there is disappointment both on the side of the EU and among the citizens (BIEPAG, 2014: 7).

EU established numerous initiatives aiming to enhance regional cooperation in the WB. To date, the most laudable EU led political initiative driven to promote regional cooperation while highlighting the EU perspective for the region is the **Brdo-Brijuni** process initiated by Slovenia and Croatia. The Western community had continuously pointed at these two countries formerly part of former - Yugoslavia expecting that both would assist other WB countries in their quest for integration to the supranational organization (Fischer & Simic, 2016: 258-259). This process to serve as a platform for cooperation, strengthening relations between the WB countries, and support for EU integration of the region while raising awareness of the need for closer ties and joint collaboration to ensure peace, security, and stability in the region.

Having the Brdo-Brijuni as a platform for regional cooperation, individual processes of each country in their path towards the EU, many argued that there is potential for overlap of processes involving the WB countries. In addition, the increased number of such initiatives does not necessarily mean success. Political challenges overly influenced by open bilateral disputes, exclusion of Kosovo in such initiatives by Serbia in spite of the so-called “Footnote Agree-

ment”¹, the most significant EU led effort to enhancing cooperation, has seriously hampered regional cooperation (Minuto-Rizzo, 2014: 74) . As such, the success of such mechanisms highly depends on bilateral and political relations between WB countries.

The Berlin Process, a new chapter for regional cooperation?

There is no doubt that the enlargement process for the WB countries has been facing difficult times. Furthermore, the EU path faced a major turning point the declaration on EU enlargement stalemate openly declared by the EU leaders². Aiming to fill the enlargement fatigue and remain relevant in the region, the Berlin Process³ was built to serve as a temporary mechanism to keep the enlargement wheel moving. Gathering all six WB states and main EU countries supporting the enlargement towards the region⁴, the process aims to send the message that even without further enlargement of the EU, accession prospects will continue to drive long overdue reforms and democratization in the region (Lilyanova, 2016).

In addition, the motivation behind the process is also driven by the raising Euro-skepticism in the region, fear of democratic backslides in the region, security challenges and lack of stability – as one of

the key issues that the EU has been facing recently. The potential Russian interest and impact in the region on the one hand, and increased interests of Turkey to become relevant in the region, mainly by major investments on the other hand have pushed the EU towards this process. Also, the promotion of the EU values – especially after the Brexit (Ivan, 2016). The impact of the Brexit has been highly noticed, clearly showing that it can lead to stagnation of enlargement for the WB, or it will slow down the entire process. The uncertainty created among the EU leaders and governments after the Brexit will leave a little room for the enlargement process. This also implies that there is a window of opportunity for other global powers to further expand their influence over the Balkans (Ilic, 2016).

While aiming to enhance regional cooperation, the first topics included investments and road networks, but promptly topics such as youth cooperation, migration, sustainable development were put into the agenda. Nonetheless, in spite of the overall advancement with regards to other topics, especially in the field of youth cooperation, the main issue keeping the region divided was put into the agenda, resolving open bilateral disputes which later on became one of the key issues within the Berlin Process (EU External Actions, 2016). This would mark another attempt by the EU to tackle such disputes while using a multi-lateral approach.

There are key obstacles present in the EU integration path, starting from Serbia’s blockade towards Kosovo’s aspiration to join regional and international organizations (Bailey, 2016), and later on Croatia stalling EU negotiations for Serbia mainly the blockade in opening chapter 23 and 24 (Milekic & Dragojlo, 2016). Furthermore, this proved that bilateral disputes are still present and can seriously disrupt EU integrations process. While some disputed are open and being tackled by the EU, there are many potential disputes involving WB states and EU member countries sharing the borders with the region. Tackling such disputes in the framework of this process is of crucial importance firstly due to fact that the EU Enlargement Strategy highlights good neighborly relations and regional cooperation as crucial

1 Arrangement Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation for Kosovo

2 Declaration of the European Commission President, Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014 stating that there will be no EU enlargement over the next five years (Commission, 2014). Later on, the EU enlargement strategy, confirmed the enlargement stalemate for the next five years, by which the EU has planned to put any further accessions on hold. Furthermore, the 2015 EU Enlargement Strategy reiterates that no new countries will be ready to join the EU during the mandate of the current Commission (Strategy, 2015).

3 The diplomatic initiative later known as the “Berlin Process” was initiated by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, this process came out of a meeting in Berlin in 2014 between Angela Merkel, the EU, and the Western Balkan leaders.

4 Austria, Croatia, France, Slovenia and Germany

elements for the integration of the WB countries to the EU (Commission, 2015), but also a stable a less unpredicted enlargement process for the region. Moreover any failure to resolve the disputes and produce tangible results will mark the Berlin Process like “every other initiative” previously launched in the region.

Regional Commitment to Solving Bilateral Disputes

Bilateral contests and disputes some between WB countries – the case of Kosovo and Serbia, and some involving a WB and another EU member state – the case of Macedonia and Greece are the key factors behind stagnation in the EU integration process.

Main bilateral disputes in the Western Balkan region are associated to the breakup of former Yugoslavia. Border demarcation disputes, property rights, and succession rights are between the most common bilateral issues. Recognition, status, and representation of minorities, refugees, and internally displaced persons are particularly challenging topics under the umbrella of bilateral disputes. Among all issues concerning the WB region, the political and border disputes represent the most challenging aspects for both the EU and the WB leaders (Burazer, 2016). First, such disputes pose potential risks by generating instability, this can lead to delays in the EU integration process. On the other hand it can also shift the attention towards democratic reforms taking place within each country, the EU gives immense importance to solving such disputes in some cases they become more important than domestic reforms, as such the main EU membership conditionality (Dimitrov, et al., 2015: 5-6).

Among **political disputes** in the region revolve around statehood recognition and national identity, as such the issues that fall under this category are the Kosovo’s contested statehood by Serbia, the latter rejects the fact of recognizing it as independent and in many cases it refuses to sit at the same negotiating table as well as obstruct Kosovo’s state-

hood. The long lasting EU facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the difficulties to ensure full implementation of the agreements reached in the framework of this dialogue, proves the complexity of political disputes in the region (Necevic, et al., 2016: 10-11). On the other hand, the tug of war between Macedonia and Greece over the official name of Macedonia is a perfect example of a bilateral dispute disrupting the EU integration process for Macedonia. Furthermore, the name issue has had a wide impact on the rise of euro skepticism in Macedonia, while also hampering the reforming process within the country (ESI, 2012).

Both disputes have been tackled by the international community, the long lasting talks and little success reaching consensus, are clear indicators that the issues are highly complex and sensitive.

Border demarcation disputes have been a lot more complicated to deal with. As of today, only border demarcation agreements have been reached between Serbia and Macedonia (Brozović, 2011: 3-4), as well as between Kosovo and Macedonia (KCSS & Safer World, 2011: 13). While the border demarcation between Kosovo and Montenegro is being discussed and followed by many debates and disagreements among parties (Popova & Tomovic, 2016)

Even Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, current European Union (EU) members, have unresolved border demarcation issues with Serbia. In addition, EU members Croatia and Slovenia have an unresolved border dispute⁵ that was agreed to be left outside the negotiation table when Croatia and Cyprus were applying for European membership, however both remains stagnant and without the “membership card” resolving both issues is rather difficult.

The EU approach towards bilateral disputes has been launched in both bilateral and multilateral levels. As such, special attention was given to solving

5 Border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia has originated in 1991 after both countries declared their independence. The most notable border issue revolves around the boundary in the Gulf of Piran. The issue has been sent to International Arbitration.

bilateral disputes, or committing the WB countries to resolving their bilateral disputes. This idea was shaped during the Vienna Summit, although it does not mark the first EU attempt to resolve bilateral disputes in the region (Marusic, 2016). As bilateral disputes in the region is not news for the EU, the latter has previously attempted to take initiatives in removing obstacles and promote cooperation in the region.

More specifically in the Declaration on the Regional Cooperation and Solution of Bilateral Disputes of this conference, where participants agree to have a framework for the next four years during which they will strive to resolve bilateral issues, and work towards reconciliation. A specific attention is given to border disputes, mainly the demarcation of borders between the WB countries (Vienna Summit Declaration, 2015). While most of the disputes involve two WB countries, since the Croatian membership into the EU, these disputed went beyond the WB borders, involving other EU members. In spite of the commitment to resolve the bilateral disputes, the signing of Annex 3 – contained the agreement to neither block nor encourage other parties to block the progress of neighboring countries on the path towards the EU integration. Moreover, this platform also aims to prevent the EU member states from using their position/ power to obstruct the accession process of the candidate countries from the region.

In spite of having the commitment to resolving the bilateral disputes and the agreement not to block each-other, the situation in reality does not appear to be as positive. The fact that Serbia block Kosovo's participation in regional initiatives directly and indirectly by using Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (Szpala, 2016), Greece not participating in the Berlin process in spite of having an open dispute with Macedonia, and the fear of other potential candidates to hamper the EU integration process for the WB countries (Necev, et al., 2016), is an indicator that countries use asymmetric powers leading to disruption of the EU integration process for the WB.

Evidently, the current bilateral disputes have quite a strong potential to destabilize the relations between the WB countries and hamper regional coop-

eration, but it will seriously disrupt the EU integration process for the WB countries (Dimitrov, et al., 2015: 6-7). As such, tackling the bilateral disputes before they turn into an obstacle in the EU integration process. Henceforth, it is of crucial importance to prevent stagnation in the EU integration process, while decreasing the potential for the EU skepticism to increase among the WB countries (Töglhofer, 2013: 9-10).

Previous attempts to resolve the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia

Undoubtedly, the political dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is one of the most intense open dispute receiving a high amount of attention by the international community, more specifically the EU as the initiator and facilitator of this dialogue (EEAS, 2016). Solving the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia in addition to the peace and stability in the region – a much wanted outcome for the EU – it also enhances the credibility of the EU In being effective in conflict resolution (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2013: 15-16).

The EU approach to the issue will not produce a positive effect, first the strongest EU form of “pressure” conditionality can be used in other cases, but not in the case of Kosovo. Unfairly, the EU conditionality towards Kosovo in the dialogue is the same way as Serbia in the EU integration process in spite of being in two different levels of integration stages. While Serbia has clearly made progress in the EU integration process⁶, Kosovo still struggles for visa liberalization and recognition by all EU member states. As long as “five non-recognizers” Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Romania deny recognition of the statehood, thus blocking Kosovo's membership aspirations (Chiriac, 2015), and there is not effort to find a solution to this issue from the EU side whatsoever. This leads to doubts in relation to the

⁶ In July 2016 Serbia opened the key negotiating chapters in the EU integration process, chapter 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security).

potential success of the current EU conditionality, with many believing that Kosovo cannot get further than the visa liberalization and stabilization association agreement. Kosovo as it stands has no possibilities to continue its path towards EU due to political barriers. However, one thing should be clear in this process, that the EU conditionality can be used only in cases when the membership criteria are clear, and applied similarly for all parties (Palokaj, 2015: 28-29). Only this way the process can be fair, and progress can be easily measurable by the EU, and transparency throughout the process can be guaranteed for all parties involved. Otherwise, the EU has been highly criticized for having an uneven approach in the talks, while favoring Serbia over Kosovo.

Since the launch of the talks between Kosovo and Serbia, a number of agreements have been reached in Brussels, aiming to reach normalization of relations. The outcome of this dialogue seems to be uncertain as most of the agreements have failed to be implemented by both sides, proving one more time that the pressure to move on in the process does not necessarily bring success (EU Parliament, 2016: 2). This clearly shows that pushing the parties into reaching negotiated settlements that do not fully align with their preferences can be risky and harm to fail the entire process. On the other hand, lacking oversight mechanisms over the implementation of the agreements, and with no pressure by the EU towards the parties to fulfill the commitments and responsibilities deriving from the agreements had decreased credibility towards the EU, thus raising euro-skepticism in both countries.

The “stability argument” continues to be relevant for EU, as such the overarching argument is that EU membership provides the best guarantee of lasting stability and security in the region. Taking this into account, at this point of time, it seems like the main EU membership conditionality revolves around the political disputes, hence, rewarding each country in the EU integration process after every step taken

towards solving bilateral disputes (Balfour & Stratulat, 2015: 237). Thus, the EU has used the leverage of the accession process as one of the main foreign policy instrument to advance the resolution of bilateral disputes and promote stability in the region. Enlargement in the eyes of the EU is rather seen as peace and stability project for the region in addition to bringing democratic change and prosperity. This approach is overshadowing the importance of internal democratic reforms within the countries. As such it will pose a major challenge as the countries are facing serious democratic backsliding.

While many disputes in the region have been discussed and tackled by the EU, one of the most recent case of EU persistence to resolve a dispute is the agreement signed in Brussels in 2012 between Kosovo and Serbia. The agreement on Regional Representation and Cooperation of Kosovo, or the so-called the footnote agreement marked a serious attempt by the EU in promoting regional cooperation while aiming to reach compromise between Kosovo and Serbia (EU, 2012).

This clearly, raises questions on the abilities of the EU to oversee or push the countries to resolve bilateral disputes. The footnote agreement showed that in highly complex situations, it is almost impossible for the EU to push this process forwards. Implementing the declaration made in Vienna between six countries is rather difficult, while there is no guarantee that the governments will continue their commitment to resolving bilateral issues (Dimitrov, et al., 2015). As such, there is a need for the EU to change approach in the Balkans while ensuring full implementation and encouraging the WB countries to resolve disputes. Also, it is of crucial importance to promote a more inclusive approach, from top-down and bottom-up, and include not only governmental and formal designs but also request the involvement of the citizens and all various stakeholders (Paris Summit: 2016).

Kosovo in between the Albanian – Serbian relations

The “Berlin Process” saw another EU strategic approach to solving bilateral disputes in the region. A new front was opened aiming to normalize the Albanian – Serbian relations, with the two prime ministers – Albania and Serbia – becoming the main protagonists discussing regional cooperation and joint projects in the framework of this process (Mecule, 2016).

Historically, diplomatic ties between Serbia and Albania were highly influenced by Kosovo, as such, the only disputed or challenge in between these two states was the status of Kosovo. The Albanian – Serbian relations were influenced by a number of factors such as nationalism, culture, ideology, but most importantly the Kosovo issue (Harris, 2016). Over the years the relations varied from frozen, distant and, at times, tense relationships depending on the stages of Kosovo statehood building process. Nevertheless, the two countries did not have an open dispute, as a matter of fact Albania is considered as the place with the least open disputes in the region. There is a potential dispute with regard to the border with Greece and the position of Albanian minority in Greece, but it is not likely that Greece will become an obstacle for Albania as it is for Macedonia. In contrary, Greece has explicitly shown support for Albania by standing firmly in favor of Albania’s candidacy in the EU during 2014 (Tovima, 2014). As such being out of the so called “yugo-sphere” historically Albania oriented its interests and built stronger ties with Greece and Italy. The distance between Albania and Serbia was reflected on the citizens’ perceptions measured in 2014, in which citizens from Serbia expressed more interest to cooperate with Kosovo rather than Albania (Vrajolli, 2013).

Indeed, Albania and Serbia are considered as the most relevant potential candidates and major players by many EU member states. Relations of both Albania and Serbia together have intensified in the past years aiming to push the EU agenda for both countries (Associated Press, 2016). As such the Berlin Process offered a rather convenient plat-

form both Albania and Serbia. Being considered as a moment of history, both leaders from Albania and Serbia took the lead in pushing forward this EU project. As such the main project implemented in the framework of the process include Albania and Serbia. The Regional Youth Cooperation Office of the Western Balkans (RYCO)⁷ is the most laudable agreement signed within the Berlin process mostly led by Albania and Serbia (RYCO, 2016). The issue of Kosovo has been brought up and discussed by both leaders, thus marking a new attempt to resolving the Kosovo – Serbia dispute through the prism of Albania and Serbia. This approach indeed was convenient for the EU as it offered a new front for tackling the Kosovo – Serbia dispute. While for Serbia, talking to Albania - a country that already has established diplomatic ties - is indeed easier than the dialogue with Kosovo.

While many have considered the vocal involvement of Albania in the process as crucial in the effort to complete the regional “puzzle” while advocating for Kosovo’s inclusion in regional initiatives. On the other hand there is shared perception that the issue of Kosovo is being discussed without the involvement of the Kosovar leaders. Breaking the ice on the Kosovo issue – as the main challenge between Albania and Serbia – might slightly improve the relations between both countries, but it will not certainly bring new improvements in resolving the Kosovo and Serbia dispute.

On the other hand, while the Albanian and Serbian relations are being set as priority for the EU, there has been no attempts into pushing the agenda towards improving or establishing relations between Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political dispute between Kosovo and BiH is deeply rooted in statehood recognition, and highly influenced by Serbia. To date, there were no attempts by the EU, or leaders from both countries to discuss issues such as freedom of movement and goods, or establishing relations between both countries.

⁷ RYCO will be aiming to “promote the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation between the youth in the region” through exchange. The agreement was signed during the Paris Summit and included leaders from all six western Balkan states.

Conclusions and Key Recommendations

The Berlin Process is expected to be reviewed every year to evaluate the progress that has been achieved. Berlin, Vienna and Paris were the first places for the EU-Western Balkan summit with Rome being the next step in 2017.

Clearly, the EU demands Western Balkan states to work together in solving regional issues like normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia, pushing for institutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the resolution of the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece.

In addition, leaders confirmed their commitment to the agenda set on the Berlin Process meeting in Vienna and Paris (only allusion to the previously discussed strategy) in particular the need to develop stronger bilateral collaboration and regional dialogue to achieve reconciliation and peace. Exchange programs for youths, which would occupy center stage in the Berlin Process.

Further efforts should be taken to overcome bilateral disputes between the WB countries, also in some cases involving EU member states, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. This calls for the EU and WB countries to make this issue priority while ensuring full commitment to resolving bilateral disputes.

The EU should use the existent important regional initiatives as a platform to promote regional cooperation, Regional Cooperation Council and other existing regional initiatives are the key institutions that can be used in regard. This also calls for full involvement of CSOs and citizens from all WB countries.

Bilateral disputes should be seen beyond border disputes, while immense attention is given to border demarcations, not clear objective has been set for the disputes between Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, name dispute between Macedonia and Greece.

The “elephant in the room” Kosovo should not be put under the shadow of the Serbian – Albanian relations. While it is clear that Albania and Serbia are strengthening their diplomatic ties, the case of Kosovo should be treated in a different platform including all parties, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia.

The Government of Kosovo – should see the Berlin Process beyond infrastructural projects, this process involves a wide range of issues concerning the region. As such, bilateral disputes, political reforms and democratization should be seen as an integral part of the Berlin process. There is a clear need to develop a plan on what Kosovo aims to benefit from the process, both politically and economically.

Annexes

Declaration on Bilateral Issues (Vienna Summit)

The governments of the Western Balkans commit themselves to a resolution of all open bilateral questions in the spirit of good neighborliness and shared commitment to European Integration. The governments agree that they will not block, or encourage others to block, the progress of neighbors on their respective EU paths.

The governments of the Western Balkans commit themselves to resolve any open questions through bilateral negotiations or other means of peaceful settlement of conflict, if this does not lead to an agreement, through international arbitration.

The governments of the Western Balkans will report annually at the Western Balkans summit on the progress made in regard to bilateral relations and outstanding bilateral questions. The first report will be prepared by the governments for the summit in Paris in 2016. Subsequent annual reports will be presented at the following summits.

The governments of the Western Balkans invite the governments of neighboring EU member states to join this commitment (Vienna Summit Declaration, 2015).

Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation of Kosovo

1. Both parties confirm their commitment to effective, inclusive and representative regional cooperation.
2. To this effect 'Kosovo*' is the only denomination to be used within the framework of regional cooperation.
3. The footnote to be applied to the asterisk in para 2 above will read:

"This designation is without prejudice to posi-

tions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence."

4. 'Kosovo*' participates on its own account and speaks for itself at all regional meetings.
5. Where new agreements are to be initialed and/or signed, a representative of 'Kosovo*' will sign under the designation in paras 2 and 3 above.
6. As concerns modifications to existing agreements signed by UNMIK, nothing in these conclusions will be interpreted as prejudicial to UNMIK's legal rights. A representative of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will be invited to meetings organized within the framework of arrangements for which it is a signatory. It is for UNMIK to decide whether to attend any particular meeting.
7. Hosts of meetings will be encouraged to avoid the display of national symbols except for their own and those of the EU, taking into account the statutes of relevant organizations.
8. The EU as Facilitator will inform relevant regional organizations and entities of these arrangements for denomination, representation and signature. They should be reflected in the practical organization of regional meetings. The EU will monitor the implementation of these arrangements.
9. Both parties and the EU will urge partners to support these arrangements and to assist in their implementation.
10. The regional organizations referred to in these conclusions are existing and future intergovernmental organizations or arrangements whose aim is to promote cooperation or integration in the Balkan region. "Regional meetings" includes meetings of these organizations and also ad-hoc or informal meetings with similar aims. It also includes meetings with EU institutions in the context of the European agenda (Footnote Agreement, 2012).

Bibliography

- Actions, E. E., 2016. *Economic Prosperity, Connectivity and Migration topped discussions at Western Balkans Summit*. [Online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2535/economic-prosperity-connectivity-and-migration-topped-discussions-at-western-balkans-summit_en [Accessed 15 August 2016].
- Agreement, F., 2012. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kosovo*. [Online] Available at: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/agreement_0210_representation.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2016].
- Anon., 2016. *Paris Summit CSO discussions*. Paris, s.n.
- Bailey, F., 2016. *Suchergebnisse*. [Online] Available at: <http://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-still-dogged-status-neutral-asterisk-mag/> [Accessed 16 August 2016].
- Balfour, R. & Stratulat, C., 2015. *EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans*, s.l.: European Policy Centre.
- Brozović, Z., 2011. *Territorial and Border Demarcation Disputes in the Western Balkans*, Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- Burazer, N., 2016. *Bilateral Issues in the Western Balkans: A Threat to European Integration?*. [Online] Available at: <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2016/06/21/bilateral-issues-in-the-western-balkans-a-threat-to-european-integration/> [Accessed 16 August 2016].
- Chiriac, M., 2015. *Romania Sticks to its Tough Line on Kosovo*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/romania-continues-not-to-recognize-kosovo-10-28-2015> [Accessed 17 August 2016].
- Commission, E., 2014. *Press release Database*. [Online] Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-984_en.htm
- Commission, E., 2015. *EU Enlargement Strategy*. [Online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf [Accessed July 2016].
- Declaration, V. S., 2015. [Online] Available at: http://www.punetesjashtme.gov.al/files/news_files/Declaration_on_Bilateral_Issues.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2016].
- Dimitrov, N., Djolai, M. & Wunsch, N., 2015. *Removing obstacles to EU accession: Bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans*, s.l.: Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group .
- EEAS, E. U. E. A., 2016. *EU facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina*. [Online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-facilitated-dialogue-normalisation-relations-between-belgrade-and-pristina/349/dialogue-between-belgrade-and-pristina_en [Accessed 17 August 2016].
- Emini, D., 2014. *Kosovo's Membership and Representation in Regional Security Initiatives*, Prishtina: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies.
- ESI, E. S. I., 2012. *Macedonia's dispute with Greece*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=562> [Accessed July 2016].
- EU, E. U., 2012. *EU facilitated dialogue: Agreement on Regional Cooperation*. [Online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/128138.pdf [Accessed July 2016].
- Fischer, M. & Simic, O., 2016. *Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons from the Balkans*, New York: Routledge.
- Geddes, A. & Taylor, A., 2015. Those Who Knock on Europe's Door Must Repent? Bilateral Border Disputes and EU Enlargement. *Political Studies Association*, pp. 4-19.
- Harris, C., 2016. *Why is there tension between Serbia and Albania*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.euronews.com/2014/10/15/why-is-there-tension-between-serbia-and-albania> [Accessed 12 August August].
- Ilic, Z., 2016. *Deutsche Welle*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/brexit-and-its-effect-on-eu-enlargement-in-the-western-balkans/a-19407598> [Accessed August 2016].
- Ivan, P., 2016. *The EU after Brexit, Russia and the countries in-between*, s.l.: European Policy Centre (EPC).
- Jackson, D., 2015. *Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans*, Berlin : Aspen Institute .
- Lilyanova, V., 2016. *The Western Balkans' Berlin Process: A New Impulse For Regional Cooperation*. [Online] Available at: <https://epthinktank.eu/2016/07/06/the-western-balkans-berlin-process-a-new-impulse-for-regional-cooperation/> [Accessed 17 August 2016].

- Marusic, S. J., 2016. *Balkan Summit Urged to Tackle Bilateral Disputes*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/civil-society-presents-dispute-tackling-measures-for-western-balkans-08-27-2015>
[Accessed 16 August 2016].
- Mecule, B., 2016. *With the Paris Summit, the EU's Balkan Connectivity Agenda Takes Shape*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.balkananalysis.com/albania/2016/07/12/with-the-paris-summit-the-eus-balkan-connectivity-agenda-takes-shape/>
[Accessed 13 August 2016].
- Milekic, S. & Dragojlo, S., 2016. *Croatia Stalls Serbia's EU Negotiation*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-stalls-serbia-s-negotiation-chapters-opening-04-07-2016-1>
[Accessed 15 August 2016].
- Minuto-Rizzo, A., 2014. *Western Balkans – The futures of integration*, Roma: NATO Defense College Foundation.
- Necev, Z., Nicić, J. & Mameledžija, S., 2016. *The Berlin Process: Crystallisation Point for the Western Balkans a Regional Study on the Implementation of the Commitments from the 2015 Vienna Western Balkans Summit*, Belgrade: Group for Development Policy.
- Palokaj, A., 2015. *Kosovo – EU Relations: The History of Unfulfilled Aspirations*, Prishtina : Kosovo Open Society Foundation KFOS.
- Parliament, E., 2016. *The Western Balkans' Berlin process: A new impulse for regional cooperation*. [Online]
Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586602/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)586602_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586602/EPRS_BRI(2016)586602_EN.pdf)
[Accessed July 2016].
- Parliament, E. U., 2016. *Serbia and Kosovo: Normalisation of relations*. [Online]
Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579079/EPRS_ATAG\(2016\)579079_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579079/EPRS_ATAG(2016)579079_EN.pdf)
[Accessed 13 August 2016].
- Popova, E. & Tomovic, D., 2016. *Border Deal Confirmation Angers Kosovo Opposition*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/experts-give-green-light-on-kosovo-border-deal-03-30-2016>
[Accessed 17 August 2016].
- Press, A., 2016. *Serbian Premier Vucic in landmark visit to Albania*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3098785/Serbias-PM-Vucic-landmark-visit-Albania.html>
[Accessed 16 August 2016].
- RYCO, 2016. *Ryco Agreement was signed*. [Online]
Available at: <https://rycowesternbalkans.org/>
[Accessed 17 August 2016].
- Strategy, E. E., 2015. *EU Commission*. [Online]
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf
[Accessed 13 August 2016].
- Studies, C. f. S.-E. E., 2014. *Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group The Unfulfilled Promise: Completing the Balkan Enlargement*, Berlin: European Fund for the Balkans.
- Szpala, M., 2016. *Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-06-08/hostages-to-dialogue-process-normalising-serbian-kosovar>
[Accessed 17 August 2016].
- Töglhofer, T., 2013. *From the West of the Balkans to the "Rest of the Balkans"? - Effects of Croatia's EU Accession on South Eastern Europe*, Berlin : Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik .
- Tomovic, D., 2015. *Montenegro to Seal Border Deal with Kosovo*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-to-seal-border-deal-with-kosovo-12-22-2015>
- Tovima, 2014. *Meimarakis: "Greece will support Albania's European candidacy in June"*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=590373>
[Accessed 15 August 2016].
- Vesnic-Alujevic, L., 2013. *European Integration of Western Balkans: From Reconciliation to European Future*, Brussels : Centre for European Studies.
- Vrajolli, M., 2013. *Regional Security Barometer*, Prishtina: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies.
- World, K. & S., 2011. *Drawing boundaries in the Western Balkans: A people's perspective*, Prishtina : Kosovar Centre for Security Studies .
- Żornaczuk, T., 2016. *Forever on the Periphery? The Return of Geopolitics to EU Enlargement to the Balkans*. *The Polish Institute of International Affairs* , pp. 2-6.

Katalogimi në botim – **(CIP)**
Biblioteka Kombëtare e Kosovës "Pjetër Bogdani"

327(4/9)

Emini, Donika

Berlin Process : path to Europe or to nowhere? / Donika Emini. – Prishtina :
Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 2016. – 16 f. ; 30 cm.

Bibliography : f. 15-18

ISBN 978-9951-679-45-9

