DESTINATION NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership

May, 2015
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................................... 6

TABLE OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................................................. 7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................................... 8

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................... 11

METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................................................................. 12

SECTION 1 – NATO’S ROLE IN KOSOVO’S POST-WAR PERIOD (1999 TO 2008) ............................................................ 13

SECTION 2 – KOSOVO-NATO RELATIONS (2008-2015) .................................................................................................. 16

  2.1. Four Non-Recognizing Countries ............................................................................................................................... 16
  2.2. Current status of relations between Kosovo and NATO .............................................................................................. 18
  2.3. Kosovo Armed Forces vis-à-vis NATO ......................................................................................................................... 23
  2.4. Kosovo’s public perception on NATO integration and comparison with regional countries .................................. 25

SECTION 3 – POLICY OPTIONS ON THE PROSPECT OF KOSOVO-NATO RELATIONS ............................................. 28

  3.1. First scenario: From Kosovo-NATO dialogue to full membership .......................................................... 28
  3.2. Second scenario: Bilateral cooperation with NATO countries ................................................................................. 32

RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................ 34

LIST OF ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................................................. 37

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................................... 39

INTERVIEWS ............................................................................................................................................................................ 44
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Adriatic Charter</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMKFOR</td>
<td>Commander KFOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNSP</td>
<td>Department for NATO and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPAP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Action Plan</td>
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<td>K-Albanians</td>
<td>Kosovo Albanians</td>
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<td>K-Serbs</td>
<td>Kosovo Serbs</td>
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<td>KAF</td>
<td>Kosovo Armed Forces</td>
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<td>KCSS</td>
<td>Kosovar Center for Security Studies</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Kosovo Police</td>
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<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<td>KSB</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Barometer</td>
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<td>KSC</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Council</td>
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<td>KSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MKSF</td>
<td>Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NAT</td>
<td>NATO Advisory Team</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NATO PA</td>
<td>NATO Parliamentary Assembly</td>
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<td>NLAT</td>
<td>NATO Liaison and Advisory Team</td>
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<td>NLOK</td>
<td>NATO Liaison Office in Kosovo</td>
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<td>NRCs</td>
<td>Non-Recognizing Countries</td>
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<td>NSRK</td>
<td>NATO Special Representative in Kosovo</td>
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<td>NWG</td>
<td>NATO Working Group</td>
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<td>OPMK</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>RACVIAC</td>
<td>Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>SSSR</td>
<td>Strategic Security Sector Review</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSCR 1244</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF FIGURES

FIGURES

Figure 1: Public perception in Kosovo towards NATO membership ................................................................. 25
Figure 2: Public perception in Kosovo compared to Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina towards NATO membership ................................................................................................. 26
Figure 3: First scenario - From Kosovo-NATO dialogue to full membership ......................................................... 31
Figure 4: Second scenario - Bilateral cooperation with NATO countries ............................................................... 33

TABLES

Table 1: Kosovo's institutional framework vis-à-vis NATO integration ................................................................. 37
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE CONTEXT:

- The relations between Kosovo and NATO first started during NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and its 78-day air strikes against Serbia. The relations further developed with the deployment of NATO-led military peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (KFOR) after the war ended in 1999. Since then, KFOR was given the leading role in the field of security and defence in Kosovo. As a result of the improved security situation in Kosovo, NATO gradually reduced its troop in Kosovo from 50,000 in 1999 to less than 5,000 soldiers in 2015 and gradually handed over some if its responsibilities to the Kosovo institutions.

CHALLENGES:

- Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 did not bring any alteration in relation between Kosovo and NATO. After the independence, NATO adopted a status neutral stance towards Kosovo and continued to operate in accordance with the Resolution 1244. This was because four NATO member countries – Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – did not recognize Kosovo.

- When it comes to cooperation with NATO, Kosovo is blocked at all aspects without enjoying the right to participate in the cooperation mechanisms and various NATO’s programmes. Kosovo has not established any official bilateral relations with NATO, making it the only Western Balkan country not to have any form of cooperation with NATO’s North Atlantic Council. Reasons for this are analysed more in depth throughout the paper.

- Based on some NATO’s official documents, Kosovo’s membership into Partnership for Peace programme could depend on its membership into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe first. Given that Kosovo is not a member country of this organization, this might yet be another impediment for Kosovo to even become part of the Partnership for Peace.

- The efforts made by policymakers in Kosovo in strengthening the relationship with NATO were limited to declaratory efforts only. Never was there any official request directed towards NATO in pursuing the latter to establish official relations with Kosovo.

- The Kosovo Assembly has not yet adopted the constitutional and legislative package which would transform the Kosovo Security Force into the Kosovo Armed Forces. This depends on the approval by the double two thirds majority of members of the Assembly – which means the two thirds of the minorities would have to agree on this. There has not been any timeline presented for such an endeavour.

- In spite of these challenges, Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries have insisted that Kosovo should move forward with its Partnership for Peace and NATO membership.
SCENARIOS

First scenario:

- The Kosovo institutions should ask explicitly for NATO’s North Atlantic Council to launch a structural and formal dialogue with Kosovo. As such, it has to be strictly linked to a timeframe of not more than two years, with the main task to prepare Kosovo to participate and gain membership in Partnership for Peace and consequently NATO itself.

- An eventual dialogue between Kosovo and NATO should focus on a comprehensive assessment of KFOR’s contribution in Kosovo and to review all the remaining duties of the mission prior to its gradual withdrawal of its troops. It should provide that the security institutions in Kosovo, in particular the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Armed Forces would be adequately consolidated and capable of taking full responsibility from KFOR for providing security throughout the whole territory of Kosovo.

- An eventual dialogue between Kosovo and NATO should foresee the gradual transfer of KFOR’s main responsibility to the Kosovo Armed Forces. Knowing that KFOR’s mandate derived by the Resolution 1244 which is not yet abrogated by the United Nations, then immediately after the Kosovo Armed Forces develop its human and operational capabilities, it would indirectly make the role of KFOR’s mission in Kosovo unnecessary in front of the NATO member countries. Consequently, the Kosovo Armed Forces’ importance would increase and may lead to the assumption of responsibilities from KFOR to guarantee a safe and secure environment in the country.

- The dialogue should contain the following issues: a process of border demarcation is required to take place between Kosovo and Serbia under either European Union or NATO mediation; the establishment of the NATO Liaison Office in Kosovo; the appointment of the NATO Special Representative in Kosovo; the establishment of the NATO working Team within the Kosovo Government.

- The final objective of the Kosovo-NATO dialogue should be the signing of a bilateral agreement between the two parties that would eventually lead to Kosovo entering into a contractual dialogue with NATO and it would enable the participation of the Kosovo Armed Forces in NATO operations.

Second scenario:

- The Kosovo institutions should be prepared for the second scenario if the first fails. Hence, this scenario focuses more on deepening bilateral cooperation with the individual NATO member countries. Kosovo has to find other alternatives to approach NATO through close cooperation with NATO member countries that have recognized Kosovo.

- The existing and the upcoming bilateral agreements should be focused on the training programmes and joint exercises of the Kosovo Armed Forces with the armed forces of the NATO member countries that have recognized Kosovo.

- Kosovo should sign bilateral agreements with Albania and Croatia so as to benefit directly from their cases as lessons learned for joining Partnership for Peace and NATO.
• Once Kosovo has reached bilateral agreements with individual countries in NATO, the Kosovo institutions may unilaterally fulfil conditions and standards required for NATO membership. In doing so, Kosovo, to some extent, will be prepared when it comes to an eventual application for membership in the Partnership for Peace programme and NATO itself.

• The Kosovo Government should increase the number of Kosovo’s Defence Attaches and diplomatic staff in its diplomatic missions in NATO member countries that have recognized Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

• It is an immediate need for the policymakers of Kosovo to undertake reforms in the institutional framework so as to put into practice the objective of developing the Kosovo-NATO contractual relations. The Kosovo institutions should carry out their duties concerning NATO integration in producing policy documents and preparing the country for membership into NATO.

• The Kosovo institutions should seek to start an official dialogue with NATO which would be limited in duration and to some extent would prepare Kosovo for the Partnership for Peace programme and for further required steps on NATO’s membership. On the other hand, NATO should consider launching the Kosovo-NATO formal and structural dialogue.

• The Kosovo institutions should seek to open a Liaison Office of Kosovo in NATO Headquarters in Brussels until Kosovo officially gets the right to send its permanent liaison officer to NATO Headquarters within the Partnership for Peace Programme as well as to establish its Permanent Representation at NATO Headquarters.

• Four NATO member countries – Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – should recognize Kosovo straight away. By taking a decision to recognize Kosovo, those countries would contribute in the long-term peace and stability in the Western Balkans as well as it would finally pave the way for Kosovo towards NATO integration.

• In reaching its capabilities to be responsible for the safety and security of the Kosovo citizens and territory, the Kosovo Armed Forces should be ready to assume tasks from KFOR given the latter will not stay in Kosovo inevitably. Furthermore, the Kosovo Armed Forces should be trained professionally based on the NATO standards of interoperability in order to be ready for participation in international peacekeeping operations.

Other recommendations are provided in the relevant section of the report.
INTRODUCTION

Membership of Kosovo within the Euro-Atlantic structures, in particular with NATO, only became a priority for Kosovar institutions in 2014 when the Strategic Security Sector Review of Kosovo was launched. The political discourse has repeatedly referred to membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, including NATO; however, until recently the practical commitments have remained only in the margins of rhetoric. This paper analyses the complex relations between Kosovo and NATO. Nevertheless, the lack of official cooperation between Kosovo and NATO should be viewed from two standpoints. On the one hand it is fairly clear that over the years following its independence, Kosovo has not demonstrated a firm political will that demands the commencement of official cooperation and a shift from operational towards political relations with NATO. Kosovo policymakers have shown only declarative commitments with regard to Euro-Atlantic integration, with no progress made in establishing relations between Kosovo and NATO. On the other hand, impediments on the objection of Kosovo’s statehood by four NATO member countries as well as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 has further served as a challenge for Kosovo’s NATO membership progression and the overall relations with NATO.

This policy paper aims to address the main challenges faced by Kosovo with regards to its membership in NATO. It also provides two concrete policy scenarios that should be pursued by the Kosovo institutions in order to proceed with the membership process and establish contractual relations with NATO. First of all, Kosovo should reconsider its institutional framework that deals with NATO integration, as well as undertake the necessary reforms related to establishing better cooperation and coordination of all institutions involved in the process. In addition, the focus of this paper is to have an impact on the Kosovo institutions and policymakers by encouraging them to take bold steps in stimulating full cooperation with its friendly NATO member countries, which would mark a turning-point in the Kosovo-NATO relationship.

The first section of this policy paper examines the context of the relations between Kosovo and NATO, from 1999, when the NATO-led peacekeeping mission (KFOR) was deployed in Kosovo aiming to establish a safe environment in the country after the war. It covers the role of KFOR across Kosovo following Kosovo’s post-war period, and the challenges of maintaining security in the northern part of Kosovo by KFOR troops including the events followed by the 2004 riots. The first part of the paper also looks at the gradual handover of competencies from KFOR to the Kosovo security institutions as well as the downsizing of KFOR troops. The second part of the paper takes a comprehensive approach in analysing the complex relations between Kosovo and NATO for the period since the Kosovo Declaration of Independence in 2008 until 2015. It aims to analyse the impediments that Kosovo is facing with regards to establishing a dialogue with NATO as well as the lack of commitment of the Kosovo institutions to deal with the NATO membership process. The aim of this part of the paper is not only to identify the existing problems and gaps, but also to provide alternative solutions in overcoming the existing impasse. As a result, this paper concludes by providing policy options for two scenarios regarding the progression of Kosovo into NATO. The paper also lists specific recommendations for the Kosovo institutions and NATO with the purpose of fostering the ascension dialogue within both parties.
METHODOLOGY

In order to successfully carry out this research, the author of the report has used both qualitative and quantitative methods of research. The qualitative data used includes a wide-ranging analysis of legal and political documents, official reports of national and international organizations, and other sources of public institutions. Additional data was gathered by conducting eight face-to-face interviews with the representatives of relevant Kosovo institutions, which include: the Kosovo Security Force, the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo, and the Office of the President of Kosovo. Interviews were also conducted with foreign missions in Kosovo, which include: the British Embassy in Prishtina and the Embassy of Croatia in Prishtina. Finally an interview was also conducted with a correspondent of Kosovo's daily “Koha Ditore” based in Brussels.

The research also relied on the public opinion polls conducted by the Kosovar Center for Security Studies under its Kosovo Security Barometer programme. The fourth edition of the Kosovo Security Barometer included a question on citizen perceptions towards NATO membership with 1001 respondents in all the regions of Kosovo. In this way, we have tested the public support in relation to Kosovo’s path towards NATO as well as the comparative perspective with other Western Balkan countries that aspire to join NATO.
SECTION 1 – NATO’S ROLE IN KOSOVO’S POST-WAR PERIOD (1999 TO 2008)

Relations in terms of joint responsibilities and goals between Kosovo and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started during the humanitarian intervention of NATO in Kosovo and its 78-day air strike campaign against Serbia. The relations between Kosovo and NATO further developed after the war in Kosovo with the deployment of NATO-led military peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (KFOR) under the international administration of the United Nations (UN). Since then, KFOR was given the leading role in the field of security in Kosovo, and in the defence of Kosovo. Its mission derived from the Military and Technical Agreement (known also as the Kumanovo Agreement) signed between NATO and representatives of former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 9 June 1999. The Kumanovo Agreement served as one of the legal foundations for the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, in which the KFOR presence in Kosovo finds the legal base.

The Kumanovo Agreement foresaw the deployment of KFOR with no obstacle throughout the entire territory of Kosovo, with the aim of establishing and maintaining a secure environment for all the citizens of Kosovo. The Kumanovo Agreement also foresaw the withdrawal of all Yugoslav and Serbian forces from Kosovo. The Yugoslav/Serbian security and military forces withdrew from Kosovo by 20 June 1999 in accordance with the Kumanovo Agreement (NATO, 2014a). In addition, the agreement also made a reference to demilitarization and demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Furthermore, the agreement addressed the issues regarding the ground and air safety zone where the FRY uniformed security forces were not allowed to operate. According to this agreement the ground safety zone included a 5-kilometre perimeter outside of the borders of Kosovo whereas the air security zone included the distance of 25 km outside the Kosovo border1 (NATO, 1999, pp. 1-2).

At the outset, KFOR consisted of more than 50,000 troops which operated under a single chain of command, that is, under the authority of the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) who reported to the Commander of Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy (NATO, 2014d). The peacekeeping mission also facilitated the process of the safe return to their homes for all displaced persons and refugees (UNSCR 1244, 1999, pp. 2-8). Furthermore, in the initial period, KFOR was involved in specific operations necessary in the immediate aftermath of war, which included: reconstruction efforts for destroyed infrastructure, as well as de-mining, medical assistance, security and public order, protection of patrimonial sites, border security, interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling, implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty programme, weapons destruction, and support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system. KFOR also undertook the provision of security for the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of Kosovo (NATO, 2014a). The majority of KFOR’s tasks occurred in coordination with other international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the Kosovo authorities and structures using civil-military cooperation tools

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1 However, since 2001 KFOR abolished its 5-kilometre wide ground safety zone between Kosovo and Serbia (NATO, 2001)
such as the Liaison and Monitoring Teams\(^2\) in order to produce tangible results in the field (Etchemendy, 2010, p. 6).

The greatest challenge during the initial stages of KFOR’s deployment was in the northern part of Kosovo. Serb security forces expelled Kosovo Albanians (K-Albanians) from their homes in the city of Mitrovica and with the support of the Serbian Government, the Kosovo Serb (K-Serb) community in Mitrovica set up parallel structures in security, education, health, and other socio-political and socio-economic issues. The French KFOR troops, that were located in Northern Mitrovica, immediately put a cordon on the bridge on the Ibar River restricting the movement of people between the southern and northern part of Kosovo (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 3). Hence, apart from the international administration, the Kosovo institutions could not access the northern part of Kosovo.

Such divisions and lack of clarity about Kosovo’s final status amongst the Albanians increased tensions over time and eventually culminated in the eruption of violent riots in March 2004. Indeed, these riots began after one of the Kosovo media announced that three K-Albanian children in northern Mitrovica had been drowned in the Ibar River, with a survivor claiming that they were attacked by Kosovo Serbs (K-Serbs) (Qehaja & Vrajolli, 2011, p. 14). On the next day violent demonstrations erupted all over Kosovo which resulted in 19 being killed (11 K-Albanians and 8 K-Serbs). Demonstrations expanded into riots, which led to houses, mainly owned by K-Serbs, to be demolished as well as several Orthodox churches burned down (BBC, 2014). Nevertheless, the role of KFOR in managing such riots was criticized due to an absence of timely intervention to halt the violence, with troops appearing to have been caught unprepared to respond effectively to the violence (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 28). The violence uncovered that KFOR did not have a structure to deal with such massive riots.

However, even a decade after the March 2004 riots there is no clear account as to how they occurred and even less so as to how they spread throughout Kosovo. Following the 2004 riots, KFOR assumed the responsibility to protect and secure religious and cultural heritage sites in Kosovo, mainly those of the Orthodox churches in Kosovo (Isufi, 2010). Given that the security situation improved over time, KFOR gradually transferred responsibility to secure such sights over to the Kosovo Police (KP). Nonetheless, the Decani Monastery still remains under a fixed KFOR operation (NATO, 2014a) as NATO Headquarters has not yet decided to transfer responsibility to the KP (Peci, 2010). Another cause is that some conditions still need to be fulfilled in order for responsibility to be secured by the KP. The latter, on the other hand, does not enjoy the trust of the Serb Orthodox bishops of the Decani Monastery (Telegrafi, 2012).

The year 2005 marked the beginning of a more steady transfer of responsibilities from the UN international administration to the Kosovo institutions. This year marked the launch of the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) – a process which aimed to evaluate institutional design and propose the new security architecture within Kosovo (United Nations Development Programme, 2006, p. 13). In 2006, the first handover of responsibilities to the Kosovo

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\(^2\) Liaison and Monitoring Teams operate within KFOR. The tasks of them consist in gathering open information through meetings with key leaders and citizens of Kosovo, across patrols and presence in the communities. The gathered information and reports of the Liaison and Monitoring Teams are utilized by the COMKFOR for operational decisions (Mårtensson, 2013, pp. 14-15).
authorities took place in the field of security, by which time the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice had been introduced. During this period, the KFOR mission remained largely unchanged, with some improvements made in the effectiveness of the forces and their ability to operate throughout Kosovo. Overall, its cooperation with the Kosovo institutions was positive, as KFOR played an important role in supporting the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and Kosovo Police Service. In addition to this, and with regard to the KPC, NATO and its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo was involved in the training and day-to-day supervision of the KPC. As of 2008, KFOR was provided with the task of assisting in the decommissioning of the KPC (NATO, 2014a), which officially dissolved in 2009 and paved the way for the creation of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).

Over the years, and as a result of the improved security environment in Kosovo, NATO decreased its presence. KFOR reduced the presence of its troops from 39,000 troops in 2002 to 17,500 in 2003 (NATO, 2014a). While an important decision was taken by NATO in 2010 when the Alliance settled on adjusting its presence in Kosovo, respectively, KFOR reduced its presence in the country to around 5,000 troops in total. At the same time, KFOR remained ready to deploy forces quickly and effectively whenever and wherever necessary, including robust reserves (NATO, 2010). According to the 2015 estimations, KFOR has less than 5,000 soldiers in Kosovo from 31 of those countries participating in the mission, including NATO and non-NATO member countries (NATO, 2015b). The possibility of any future decision on a reduction of KFOR’s troop presence will be measured against clear benchmarks and indicators, and will remain condition-based and not calendar-driven (NATO, 2014b). Such a decision requires the approval of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO.

In the meantime, one of the major steps taken was the transfer of responsibilities for the control and safeguarding of the Kosovo borders from KFOR to the KP. The control and supervision of the border-line between Kosovo and three of the four neighbouring countries of Kosovo (Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro) were transferred to the KP after the Declaration of Independence in 2008. However, the borderline between Kosovo and Serbia still remains under the sole responsibility of KFOR troops because of sensitive relations between Kosovo and Serbia and the continued tense relationship between the K-Serbs and K-Albanians. In particular, a significant problem appeared to be the eastern green border crossing with Serbia which falls under the control of KFOR. According to concerns of the Karaceva people, during 2014, the Serbian Gendarmerie has provoked the local population on different occasions by violating the Kumanovo Agreement and illegally entering into the territory of Kosovo (Sadiku, 2014). This violation continues to reflect the anxiety and fear among the inhabitants of that area which has often led to protests amongst the local population asking for KFOR and the Kosovo institutions to address their grievances (Telegrafi, 2014).

New circumstances were stimulated by the events which occurred in Kosovo in 2008. The failure of the Kosovo-Serbia Vienna status negotiations (2005-2007); the Declaration of Independence by the Assembly of Kosovo in February 2008; and post-independence internal and external challenges, have changed the political and security context in Kosovo. The next section examines relations of the Kosovo institutions with KFOR, respectively, NATO between 2008 and 2015.

International efforts to find a solution to the status of Kosovo through the UN-mediated Vienna negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia proved to be unsuccessful. However, the role of NATO during this process has been important in fulfilling its security and peacekeeping duties in Kosovo as well as in providing political support for these negotiations. For instance, the Secretary General of NATO participated at the meetings of the Contact Group which observed and supported the negotiations on the future status of Kosovo. In the course of these meetings the Contact Group ministers recall NATO's commitment to maintain a safe and secure environment through KFOR (UNOSEK, 2006a, p. 2). They also welcomed NATO's plan for the continuation of the international military presence in Kosovo following the status settlement (UNOSEK, 2006b, p. 2). KFOR helped maintain safety and stability in Kosovo allowing the negotiations to proceed without any worry as to the potential escalation of the security situation in Kosovo. By the end of 2007 the Foreign Ministers of NATO member countries agreed that KFOR would remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244, unless the UNSC decided otherwise and, as a result, they further renewed their commitment to maintain KFOR's national force contributions, including reserves, at levels that were present at the time, and with no new caveats (NATO, 2014c). Despite the fear of potential security threats that would come through unforeseen inter-ethnic conflict, only a few small scale demonstrations were registered (Qehaja & Vrajolli, 2011, p. 21).

Soon after the failure of negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, the Kosovo Assembly proclaimed the Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 in full accordance with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, also referred to as the Ahtisaari Plan. A day after independence was declared; the NAC of NATO issued a statement which has thoroughly shaped the neutral position and approach of NATO in respect to Kosovo's independent status since 2008. It pointed out that NATO reaffirms that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244, as agreed by Foreign Ministers in December 2007, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise, and that NATO's responsibility and capability to ensure a safe and secure environment in Kosovo remains unchanged (NATO, 2008). The change of the political landscape in Kosovo as of 2008 did not bring any alteration in relations between Kosovo and NATO. The latter has kept its presence in Kosovo in accordance to UNSCR 1244. NATO continued to operate with its status and responsibilities unchanged in accordance with the UNSCR 1244, due to the fact that not all of its member states recognized Kosovo after declaring its independence in February 2008. NATO's neutral stance towards Kosovo's independence presented a challenge for Kosovo's membership path in NATO.

2.1. Four Non-Recognizing Countries

The relations and communication between Kosovo and NATO continued, however, with ambiguity, since Kosovo operated in accordance to its new status and Constitution, while NATO maintained its neutral stance towards Kosovo's new status. From NATO's perspective, cooperation was carried out under the framework of UNSCR 1244, with the exception of support provided to the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF) in which NATO contributed through the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) at the MKSF and NATO Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT) at the KSF. Such cooperation, however, has
not resulted in the introduction of any contractual relations between Kosovo and NATO due to the fact that not all NATO member states have recognized Kosovo’s independence. Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain are the four Non-Recognizing Countries (NRCs) out of NATO’s 28 members that continue to reject the independence which is hindering Kosovo’s membership process into NATO. The NRCs refuse to recognize Kosovo on the grounds that Kosovo’s independence was declared in violation of international law and UNSCR 1244. However, despite the Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 of the International Court of Justice which concluded that the declaration of independence did not violate general international law and the UNSCR 1244, NATO’s NRCs did not make any move towards Kosovo’s recognition (International Court of Justice, 2010, p. 53).

There are other justifications, however, on why the NATO’s NRCs do not recognize Kosovo. For instance, the Spanish position on the independence of Kosovo is not related to developments in Kosovo, but it is linked directly with the domestic problems that Spanish authorities face with the will of the people of the Basque Country and Catalonia to declare independence from Spain (Fanés, 2012, p. 13). While Spain, in particular, maintains a robust discourse against Kosovo’s statehood which may cause serious challenges regarding Kosovo’s ambition to achieve NATO membership, the other three NRCs undertook a positive and important step towards setting up good relations with Kosovo by their decision to recognize the passports of Kosovo. Officially however, they also maintain their reasoning for the non-recognition of Kosovo. Following Kosovo’s independence, Slovakian politicians stated that there is a risk of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia breaking away and becoming part of Hungary (Hurn, 2008). Romania’s opposition on the status of Kosovo is highlighted by the fear that the ethnic Hungarians living in the province of Transylvania may try to secede from Romania (Marinas, 2008). While the official position of Greece is that the status of Kosovo needs to be resolved through diplomacy and consensus by building an environment of peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the region, with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the protection of minorities (Armakolas & Karabairis, 2012, p. 112). In addition, Greece’s position on Kosovo, compared to the other NATO’s NRCs, has been more optimistic over the years.3

What must also be noted is that some of these NRCs have strong traditional, religious and cultural relations with Serbia, which firmly rejects Kosovo’s independence. In spite of this, the case of Kosovo is sui generis, different and dissimilar from other regions wishing to declare independence. Therefore, it cannot serve as an example to be followed by other countries. Despite their opposition to recognize Kosovo, these NRCs support the European Union (EU)-facilitated political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, and its purpose of normalizing the relations between the two parties.

Despite the non-recognition of independence, the NATO’s NRCs have contributed significantly with their respective troops in the KFOR peacekeeping mission in different regions of Kosovo. While Greece and Romania continue to keep their troops in Kosovo, Spain and Slovakia decided to withdraw their troops in 2009 and 2010. In fact, according to the Spanish Government officials, the withdrawal of 600 Spanish soldiers from Kosovo was justified by the fact that the mission of Spanish troops had been completed, stating that “it is time to

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3 The head of the Liaison Office of Greece in Pristina, Konstantina Athanassiadou said that even though her country does not recognize Kosovo, however, at the same Greece time does not exclude the possibility on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in the future. In January 2015 she declared that at the right time, Greece will take the right decision and stated that Kosovo has a clear Euro-Atlantic perspective (AAB, 2015).
return home” (BBC, 2009). Similarly, Slovakia withdrew its contingent troops from KFOR on the grounds that it accomplished the mission in Kosovo. According to the senior officials of the Slovak authorities “the contract was valid until the autumn of 2010” and that Slovakia met its commitments in Kosovo (The Slovak Spectator, 2010a). There is no indication as to any other reason on why these two countries withdrew their troops from Kosovo, besides their own military reasons. Slovakia withdrew troops because it wanted to redeploy them in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, while the Spanish Government was under pressure to do the same (Burnett, 2009). Another reason includes also the financial burdens and budgetary restrictions of both countries, which influenced them to withdraw troops from the NATO mission in Kosovo (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012, p. 11).

Senior officials of these countries including the Prime Minister of Slovakia (September 2010), Spanish Minister of Defence (March 2009) and the Prime Minister of Romania (November 2014) visited Kosovo, in particular KFOR and their nation troops based in Kosovo. Apart from this, they did not meet, at least officially, any of their counterparts from the side of the Kosovo institutions. This shows that the issue of non-recognition of independence by these countries hinders any official cooperation between Kosovo and the NRCs. NATO’s NRCs position towards Kosovo and their hesitation to establish any contact with the Kosovo authorities show that they can serve as blocking parties within NATO to any potential participation by Kosovo in NATO’s programmes and partnerships. Nevertheless, as it will be shown later in this report, the Kosovo institutions have prepared neither a plan, a strategy, nor at least a document on how to approach these countries and cooperate with them in related fields despite of the issue of non-recognition.

2.2. Current status of relations between Kosovo and NATO

Despite NATO’s direct involvement in Kosovo for close to 15 years and irrespective of the fact that all Kosovo’s neighbouring countries have the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmes with NATO, Kosovo is the only country left out of the NATO enlargement process. Kosovo has not established any official, bilateral, or contractual relations with NATO, and it is the only Western Balkan country that does not have any form of cooperation with the NAC of NATO. Furthermore, when it comes to cooperation with NATO, Kosovo is blocked at all aspects without enjoying the right to participate in the cooperation mechanisms and various programmes of NATO organization as a result of NATO’s neutral stance to Kosovo. As long as the Euro-Atlantic integration is consistently mentioned as an aspiration of the Kosovo institutions it is useful to compare Kosovo’s potential NATO membership with that of potential EU membership. Compared to its membership aspiration into NATO, Kosovo has, at least, marked some progress in the EU membership process. With respect to its prospective

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4 For instance, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, Iveta Radičová had a visit to Kosovo in September 2010 where she met the Slovak contingent in KFOR and COMKFOR as well, but she did not have a meeting with then the Prime Minister of Kosovo or other representatives of the Kosovo institutions (The Slovak Spectator, 2010b). The Spanish Minister of Defense, Carme Chacón visited the troops of Spain in KFOR in March 2009, but there is no record that she met her counterpart from the Kosovo Government (Burnett, 2009). Furthermore, in November 2014 the Prime Minister of Romania, Victor Ponta and the Minister of Romanian National Defence, Mircea Dusa had a meeting in Pristina with COMKFOR at the KFOR Headquarters. They confirmed that Romania will continue to support KFOR mission and political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (NATO, 2014e), but as the previous delegations of NRCs, they did not plan to meet also representatives of the Kosovo institutions.
membership into the EU, Kosovo initialled the Stabilisation and Association Agreement; it is involved in official structured dialogue with the EU on rule of law, as well as participating regularly in the EU programmes dedicated for the Western Balkans. There are also EU NRCs that are hindering Kosovo’s progress towards EU membership; however, it is the structural organisation of the EU, which unlike with NATO, allows for Kosovo to make some progress. Besides this, the EU has been much more active in Kosovo’s political processes and in the shaping of its socio-political aspects in comparison to NATO’s involvement, which more often than not has remained in the margins when it comes to the membership process.

There are a number of other reasons as to why Kosovo is not on the same footing with its membership process and aspirations towards NATO compared to its efforts made towards the EU. Firstly, NATO’s mission in Kosovo is determined by the UNSCR 1244 which has not been abrogated. In other words, NATO continues to narrowly interpret the UN Resolution regardless of the new circumstances on the ground as well as the new political reality in Kosovo since 2008 (Palokaj, 2014). Secondly, the position of the NATO’s NRCs on the status of Kosovo has impeded the ambition of Kosovo to initiate official relations with NATO, and due to NATO’s organizational structure, the NRCs have been much more effective in blocking Kosovo movements towards NATO membership than with Kosovar relations with the EU. Thirdly, Kosovo was under international supervision between 2008 and 2012 and the country was still consolidating its statehood process. Thus, during this period no progress had been marked towards official cooperation with NATO, as the Kosovo institutions had some limitations with regards to defence policies. Lastly, since September 2012, the Kosovo policymakers’ discourse regarding membership into NATO has been mostly declarative. The Euro-Atlantic integration was within the margins of political discourse with no specific commitment and tangible results regarding Kosovo’s potential membership into NATO.

The path of Kosovo towards membership in the EU and NATO differ in another aspect. Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo's independence, has expressed the ambition to join the EU and since 2014 the EU formally launched accession negotiations with Serbia (European Commission, 2014). But the EU and some of its Member States have conditioned Serbia’s EU membership through normalizing relations with Kosovo under the principle of regional cooperation (Maksimovic, 2014). Thus the EU may influence Serbia as well as the five EU Member States that do not recognize Kosovo to soften their stance on Kosovo’s aspiration to the EU membership. The opposite is given with regard to NATO membership, with the National Assembly of Serbia since 2007 adopting a resolution which has declared Serbia’s status of military neutrality towards NATO membership (B92, 2007). Consequently, Serbia, at least officially, does not have the aim of achieving membership in NATO, which, on the other hand, makes it more difficult for NATO itself to condition Serbia, respectively to influence the other NATO’s NRCs in particular to soften their attitudes towards Kosovo’s aspiration to join NATO.

It is obvious that between 2012 until 2014, the Kosovo institutions have placed more stress on EU integration rather than NATO membership, demonstrating no political will to enter into official relations with NATO and to participate in the PfP programme. In fact, institutions committed to work on the country’s NATO membership emerged in 2008, immediately after the independence, so they were largely new in dealing with the issue. Kosovo's institutional framework dealing with the NATO membership process is not yet complete and even the existent institutions have demonstrated that they lag behind in relation to the country’s membership in NATO. They
are faced with the lack of internal capacities and lack of human resources. The Department for NATO and Security Policy (DNSP) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has not produced any document, or a national strategy with regards to actions that could encourage the NATO membership process. Such a strategy is needed in order to shape policies that various institutions should then follow concerning the PfP programme and NATO integration. This demonstrates that the NATO membership process has not been a priority for the Kosovo institutions. Therefore, in addition to challenges posed by the UNSCR 1244 and NATO's NRCs, it is also the failure of relevant Kosovo institutions, and MFA in particular, to take more serious steps towards the membership process into NATO that has served as an impediment in this regard. In addition to this, Kosovo has made much more efforts to move with the EU membership agenda, while at the same time failing to even ask their friendly NATO member countries to push ahead the agenda on its NATO membership. It is worth mentioning that it was only in 2014 that Kosovo put forth its aim to join NATO as a vision and priority of the institutions mentioned in the Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR) (Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 2014, f. 7). One of the objectives of the SSSR is Kosovo's integration and membership into Euro-Atlantic structures as both a beneficiary and contributor. The SSSR referred to the gradual transformation of the KSF to the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) with a mission to protect Kosovo's sovereignty and territorial integrity, while the MKSF will be renamed as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) with the objective of exercising civilian and democratic control of the KAF. Another objective of the SSSR is the preparation of capabilities of relevant institutions to contribute to peace and humanitarian operations and other international mission of NATO (Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 2014, pp. 20-31). However, the objectives and recommendations of the SSSR with respect to the KAF are yet to be adopted by the Kosovo Assembly. Kosovo was unable to adopt them due to a political impasse in Kosovo in the second half of 2014 which is expected to proceed into 2015.

Despite Kosovo's inability to independently push for entry into official relations with NATO, there were a number of NATO member countries that have required and insisted that Kosovo should move forward with its NATO membership. On 5 February 2014 a group of members of the U.S. (United States) Congress, including Michael Turner and Eliot L. Engel, signed and addressed a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, regarding the involvement of Kosovo's membership in the PfP. They have asked Secretary Kerry to work with friendly NATO member countries to ensure that Kosovo joins its neighbours as a member of the PfP, and that it has a pathway for eventual membership into NATO. In addition, they have stated that Kosovo should have a clear path towards integration with the Alliance (Engel, 2014). Also, senior representatives of NATO and its member states have constantly declared that Western Balkan countries, including Kosovo, have Euro-Atlantic prospects.

5  For more details as to Kosovo’s institutional framework vis-à-vis NATO integration, see Table 1 at the List of Annexes.
6  For more details on the KAF, see the sub-section 2.3.
7  The PfP is the first, and a fundamental, step for a prospective country's way to joining NATO. It is a practical bilateral cooperation between the individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO, which allows partners to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. The PfP was launched in the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit with the aim to enhance cooperation and stability in Central and Eastern European countries between relevant partner countries and NATO. Activities under the PfP touch upon virtually every field of NATO activity, including defence-related work, defence reform, defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military-to-military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster response, and cooperation on science and environmental issues (NATO, 2014g).
The NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg visited Prishtina in January 2015. Apart from a meeting at KFOR HQ with COMKFOR, he also met with the leaders of the Kosovo institutions, including Kosovo’s President, Prime Minister, Minister of the KSF and the former KSF Commander. In addition to this, President Atifete Jahjaga held a state reception in honour of Secretary Stoltenberg (Office of the President of Kosovo, 2015). Stoltenberg brought a positive message from Brussels where he stated that Kosovo should move towards peace and prosperity in order to gain its future within the Euro-Atlantic community and is, therefore, welcomed to participate in the Euro-Atlantic cooperation mechanisms (NATO, 2015a). However, he did not make any reference with respect to Kosovo’s aspirations towards NATO integration. The chief of NATO, on the other hand, declared that KFOR is going to stay in Kosovo on conditional, rather than on a calendar basis, which implies that the Kosovo institutions will take the full responsibility from KFOR only when NATO considers withdrawing from Kosovo. Stoltenberg also provided NATO’s support on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia for a better future for both countries (NATO, 2015c). On the other hand, during this visit, the Kosovo leaders demanded a partnership between Kosovo and NATO. President Jahjaga highlighted that the Kosovo institutions and NATO must work in full partnership in developing Kosovo’s forces in compliance with NATO standards, and that such a partnership needs to be transformed into a contractual relationship between Kosovo and NATO (Office of the President of Kosovo, 2015).

While senior officials at the MKSF stressed that Kosovo wants to establish a partnership with NATO, its path and aspiration is ultimately to become a full member of NATO. According to a press release issued by the MKSF, Minister Haki Demolli requested from the NATO Secretary General to establish a political dialogue between Kosovo and NATO, and in order to do so, he proposed the best way would be for NATO to appoint a Special Representative in order to conduct the dialogue (MKSF, 2015). In order to progress towards reaching the PfP, senior representatives of the MKSF have appealed that the relevant Kosovo institutions, more precisely the MFA, on behalf of Kosovo, should prepare and submit to NATO the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). According to Minister Demolli, the IPAP should highlight the importance of the advancement of inter-operability capacities of the KSF. In case NATO approves an IPAP, then it will pave the way for the KSF, or the forthcoming KAF, to attain PfP membership (Assembly of Kosovo, 2015, p. 3). The problem is that the Kosovo policymakers have made demands only declaratively during meetings with the NATO senior representatives; beyond this Kosovo has never made an official request to the NATO authorities.

These are not the only impediments and issues that have brought Kosovo to lag behind in its relations with NATO. According to senior officials of the Kosovo institutions, Kosovo’s membership in NATO might initially depend on its membership into the UN. This is problematic given that there is a strong opposition from the two permanent members of the UNSC, namely Russia and China, who strongly reject Kosovo’s independent status. However, at his hearing in front of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Kosovo Assembly, on 9 February 2015, Minister Demolli stated that official documents of NATO do not contain any explicit reference if a country aspiring to join NATO should be a member state of the UN (Assembly of Kosovo, 2015, p. 3). Also, based on some official NATO documents, including the 1995 Study on Enlargement and statements of senior officials within Kosovo institutions, Kosovo’s membership into the PfP could firstly depend on its membership into the Organization for...
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Given that Kosovo is not a member country of the OSCE, this may pose another impediment for Kosovo to become part of the PfP.

In spite of these challenges, there are still some opportunities for Kosovo to establish some official cooperation with NATO. For instance, in August 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Edgars Rinkēvičs has pointed out that “a structured dialogue with NATO is possible” and added that in case Kosovo and the NATO member countries are ready to cooperate, “a structural and formal dialogue can be developed” (Koha Net, 2014a). Furthermore, he has taken Kosovo’s structural dialogue with the EU as a good example, and has proposed that such a dialogue should be initiated with NATO as well. In fact, the Latvian Minister’s statement should be seen as a good signal towards the necessity for Kosovo to be directly involved in NATO’s wider cooperation mechanism. On the other hand, with respect to cooperation with NATO member countries, the MKSF has reached a number of bilateral agreements, respectively including memorandums of cooperation8, annual bilateral plans, state partnership9 and memorandums regarding the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)10 with eleven countries (nine NATO member countries and two non-NATO member countries).

Besides Kosovo’s blocking in relation to NATO integration, Kosovo did manage to have a partial participation in one NATO related body. As of May 2014, the Kosovo Assembly has officially become a parliamentary observer in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2014a). Two members of the Kosovo Assembly may take part in the capacity of observers in sessions of the NATO PA. This, however, does not mean that Kosovo has marked any progress towards its membership prospective in NATO. NATO PA is institutionally separate from the NATO structure, it works independently from NATO (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2013) and it is not linked with the latter in terms of the Euro-Atlantic integration process. According to the NATO PA’s Rules of Procedure, Kosovo as a parliamentary observer may attend sessions of the NATO PA with an invitation by its President and with the consent of the Standing Committee, which is the leading decision-making body, and subject to the approval of the Assembly. In addition, it may participate in meetings of the Committees of the NATO PA and may speak, but cannot be entitled to vote or move amendments (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2014b, p. 4).

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8 From 2012 until 2015 the MKSF signed Memorandums of Cooperation with Albania, Croatia, Latvia, Germany, Macedonia, Slovenia, Turkey, Sweden and the U.S. Those memorandums affect different fields, including: defence and security between both ministries, unification of education and military training, training the KSF members, training and cooperation in the field of military health, military financial aid as well as financial assistance.

9 In 2011 the MKSF reached the State Partnership with the U.S. National Guard of Iowa. During implementation of this programme over the years, the KSF members on one hand has participated in field exercises in Iowa and have exchanged experiences with Iowa National Guard, while members of the latter on the other hand have provided advise for the KSF.

10 In February 2012 senior representatives of the Kosovo Government and the U.S. Government signed SOFA’s agreement between Kosovo and the U.S. that provides the legal framework within which American military and the U.S. Department of Defence civilian personnel who are not part of NATO mission will operate in Kosovo’s territory. Based on Kosovo’s MFA, the U.S. personnel will be working with members of the KSF to further develop its capacity in order to perform its four core missions of Fire-fighting, Search and Rescue, Hazardous Material Disposal, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (MFA, 2012). In July 2013 the MKSF and MoD of Albania signed a memorandum of the SOFA. It adjusts entry, exit, temporary stationing and status of the members of the Albanian Armed Forces and the KSF in the territories of the respective states (MKSF, 2013, p. 3).
Kosovo has put its membership to regional security initiatives at the top of the agenda, believing that membership in such initiatives would make its path to PfP and NATO much easier (Kraja, 2014). This is believed because a similar strategy was adopted by Albania and Croatia during their path towards joining NATO in 2009. Since October 2014, Kosovo has been a member of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) – Centre for Security Cooperation. However, Kosovo is not fully recognized into RACVIAC. Apart from on the political level through permanent participation on equal terms in all activities of RACVIAC, the KSF and its representatives do not have the right to participate in the meetings of RACVIAC due to Serbia’s opposition (RACVIAC, 2014b). Its scope of activities includes a wide range of politico-military issues, including security sector reform and international and regional cooperation with a focus on Euro-Atlantic integration (RACVIAC, 2014a). As Kosovo is now a member of this organization, it will be able to fulfil the criteria for NATO membership and will contribute to the enhancement of regional stability (Emini, 2014, p. 17). Another important regional initiative is the Adriatic Charter (AC) to which Kosovo has applied for membership in 2012, without yet succeeding in becoming a member. After becoming a member of RACVIAC, the Kosovo authorities expect to join the AC as soon as possible. Kosovo has attended conferences, activities and events of the AC in the capacity of an observer; however, membership in this initiative is firmly contested by Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) (Koha Net, 2014b). The AC is an initiative of the U.S. in order to assist, support and prepare the Western Balkan countries to join NATO (Çeku, 2014).

### 2.3. Kosovo Armed Forces vis-à-vis NATO

Following the sixth anniversary of Kosovo’s independence, on 17 February 2014, the former Kosovo Prime Minister, Hashim Thaçi, announced the establishment of the KAF (OPMK, 2014). This announcement, which was made a few months before the parliamentary elections of 2014, was received by surprise by some of Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries. A foreign diplomat of an embassy in Kosovo pointed out that it was somewhat unexpected that it came ahead of the pending elections. Nevertheless, according to him, it is up to Kosovo to decide whether it wants to implement the transition of the KSF to the KAF, but such an endeavour requires a constitutional change, and therefore a double two thirds majority in the Kosovo Assembly. This means that the two thirds of the minority communities in Kosovo, majority held by the K-Serb community, should also agree on such a transition. The Kosovo Assembly, however, has not yet adopted the legislation package on KAF’s establishment.

Above all, having modern armed forces is a crucial pillar of the contemporary defence sector, and as a sovereign state, and judging by its security environment, Kosovo may hold the right to have the KAF in place. Apart from other duties, the KAF will supersede the role of KFOR in Kosovo once NATO decides to withdraw troops from the country and thus the KAF will be in charge of guaranteeing a safe and secure environment for all Kosovo citizens. It has to consolidate further civil defence

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11 The AC promotes the stability and Euro-Atlantic integration of all the Western Balkan countries by bolstering political, defence, and economic cooperation among the partners and between them and their neighbours. The intention of the U.S. is to continue assisting these countries in implementing necessary reforms on their path to NATO’s membership in order to strengthen democratic institutions, civil society, rule of law, market economies, and NATO-compatible militaries (U.S. Department of State, 2011).
components, including crisis management, emergency preparedness, contingency planning, and emergency services, providing military support to civil authorities as well as combating disasters resulting from terrorist attacks.

According to the SSSR, the KAF will be a national military force, reflecting the ethnic diversity of the people of Kosovo, recruited from among the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo, equipped to perform defence missions, authorized to serve within country and be deployed abroad to support peace support operations. It is deemed to be comprised of a maximum of 5,000 active personnel and a maximum of 3,000 reserve personnel (Kastrati, 2014) and it will be responsible for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo. According to the Kosovo Government, the KAF will be built based on the NATO standards of inter-operability. It will have a clear goal of eventual participation in international operations, as part of a national strategy to build a closer relationship with NATO and ultimately leading to NATO membership (Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 2014, pp. 29-30). It is foreseen that the MKSF will be renamed the MoD of Kosovo with the purpose of providing civilian oversight and guidance to the KAF. Furthermore, it should formulate, implement, and develop defence policies of Kosovo.

Transformation of the MKSF to the MoD and that of the KSF to the KAF, according to the senior officials of the MKSF, is getting accomplished in full cooperation with the U.S. Government, namely the Defence Institution Reform Initiative, Iowa National Guard, U.S. Embassy in Prishtina and two NATO teams in Kosovo, namely NAT and NLAT. Also, the MKSF has drafted the Law on Transformation of the KSF to the KAF; however, the latter is not adopted yet by the Kosovo Assembly as the establishment of the KAF requires an amendment to the Constitution of Kosovo. Apart from the law, Minister Demolli declared that there are sixteen constitutional amendments pending to be approved by the double two thirds majority of members of the Assembly, including votes of two thirds of the minority communities in the Assembly. On the other hand, the process of the creation of the KAF is depended upon the political developments, Minister Demolli has expressed the view that the Kosovo institutions do not have a timeline as when such changes are expected to be voted on the relevant legislation and constitutional packages (Assembly of Kosovo, 2015, p. 3).

Establishment of the KAF, however, has not been discussed inside NATO structures and it is neither formally contested nor supported, even though the senior representatives of the Kosovo Government have said that NATO supports the KAF (Kastrati, 2014). On the other hand, NATO’s senior officials have expressed the view that the creation of the KAF is an “internal affair” of the Kosovo institutions. During his visit to Kosovo in January 2015, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg stated that “the key message is that NATO is not going to dictate, NATO is not going to decide” on the creation of the KAF (NATO, 2015a). He added that NATO is just fulfilling its mission in Kosovo in accordance with the UN mandate from 1999 and it is supporting Kosovo on the capacity building of the KSF within its mandate. According to Secretary Stoltenberg, whatever the Kosovo institutions decide on the KAF, it should be completed in a way that does not create new tensions; does not contribute to more instability; and without hindering the dialogue between all the different ethnic groups in order to foster more reconciliation in Kosovo’s society. He further added that it depends upon the Kosovo institutions to decide on the KAF, whereas Kosovo’s Prime Minister Isa Mustafa promised that Kosovo will get the full consent of all political subjects, including the K-Serb community, on establishing the KAF (OPMK, 2015).
The formation of the KAF is supported strongly by Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries. Senior officials of the U.S. Government have expressed their support for the Kosovo institutions on completion of transformation of the KSF to the KAF. A press release of Kosovo’s MFA said that the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, Evelyn N. Farkas, at a meeting in Pentagon with the Kosovo Government’s representatives, stressed that Kosovo will enjoy the support of the U.S. in the field of security (MFA, 2015). In addition to this, it was noted that the steps of establishing the KAF will make sure that it translates into Kosovo’s path towards membership in PfP and NATO.

2.4. Kosovo’s public perception on NATO integration and comparison with regional countries

Even though NATO does not recognize the country and as such it does not have any official relations with Kosovo, it enjoys a high level of trust and credibility among the citizens of Kosovo. When it comes to the Euro-Atlantic integration of Kosovo, citizens of Kosovo strongly support the vision of the country to join NATO as well as the work of its international presence in Kosovo (KFOR) in providing security for all citizens.

![Figure 1: Public perception in Kosovo towards NATO membership](image)

The opinion poll of the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB) conducted by the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS), which took place in October 2014 shows that a large majority of respondents (88.7 percent) think that the country should become a NATO member. According to the KSB results, 8.7 percent of respondents were opposed to NATO membership while 2.6 percent of them did not know, or had no opinion on the subject regarding Kosovo’s membership into NATO.

On the other hand, the K-Serbs have a thoroughly different opinion on the question of whether Kosovo should become a NATO member; hence most of them have responded negatively when

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12 (Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 2014).
asked on this matter. Compared to the majority of the K-Albanian population and others, 76 percent of K-Serb respondents firmly oppose the integration of Kosovo into NATO; only 8 percent of them are in favour of it, whereas 16 percent among K-Serb respondents that they do not have an opinion if Kosovo should join NATO. Refusal of the K-Serb community on Kosovo’s integration into NATO can be explained by NATO’s humanitarian intervention and its air-strike against Serbia in order to halt the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999.

Despite the high level of support demonstrated by Kosovo citizens (except K-Serbs) and institutional leaders, the aforementioned political challenges are largely holding Kosovo back from entering the Euro-Atlantic integration process. However, it can be argued that the support towards NATO which has been shown consistently by the Kosovo citizens is made up of two reasons. First, the international presence of NATO has contributed significantly towards the improvement of the security situation in Kosovo’s territory, except in the northern part of Kosovo, as well as the building of trust between communities in the country. The second reason refers to the aspirations of Kosovo in joining NATO, which is explicitly mentioned in almost every state official document alongside EU integration. As such, and according to political discourse in Kosovo, Euro-Atlantic integration is considered as one of the main medium to long term goals (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012, p. 12).

Kosovo citizens’ views on NATO membership are quite different compared to other aspiring countries of the Western Balkans. In Montenegro, for example, the public perception towards NATO integration is relatively low. According to the 2014 poll of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, 45 percent of the respondents would vote against membership in NATO. Membership of Montenegro in NATO is supported only by 35 percent of citizens and 20 percent of citizens are undecided or do not have an opinion concerning the Euro-Atlantic integration. However, Montenegro joined the PfP programme in 2006 and in 2009 NATO granted to Montenegro the

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13 (Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 2014); (Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, 2014, p. 9); (International Republican Institute, 2014, p. 13); (Foreign Policy Initiative BH, 2012, p. 58).
Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership

Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP is the final stage of an aspiring country to prepare for potential membership and to demonstrate its ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future membership (NATO, 2014h). Regardless of the low support for membership into NATO by the Montenegrin citizens, compared to the support that the Kosovo citizens have, NATO has established official cooperation and relations with Montenegro and by the end of 2015 NATO will assess whether to invite the country to join the organization (NATO, 2014f).

Public opinion in Macedonia predominantly supports membership into NATO. The International Republican Institute’s opinion poll of 2014 has indicated that citizens of Macedonia share a similar opinion with the Kosovo citizens, though there are some slight differences in percentages in comparison with Kosovo. Accordingly, 77 percent of them favoured Macedonia’s membership in NATO, 15 percent expressed an objection concerning NATO integration, while 7 percent did not have an opinion. Nevertheless, there is a huge difference between Kosovo and Macedonia in regards to the progress that both countries are making towards membership into NATO. In 1995, Macedonia joined the PfP programme and in 1999 it was granted the MAP, but the membership of Macedonia in NATO remains pending since Greece had blocked an invitation for Macedonia to join NATO in the 2009 Bucharest Summit, as there is a dispute between both countries over Macedonia’s official name (Lungescu, 2008). However, NATO’s stance is that once a mutually acceptable solution has been reached with Greece, Macedonia will be invited to join NATO (NATO, 2014j). It is worth mentioning that for the citizens of Macedonia, the name of the country is more important than membership into NATO. Apart from other issues, 6 percent of respondents answered that the most serious problem is the country’s name, whereas only 3 percent responded that NATO integration is the most serious problem (International Republican Institute, 2014, p. 4).

Similar to Macedonia, the majority of BiH’s citizens support NATO integration. According to an opinion poll carried out in 2012 by the Foreign Policy Initiative BH, the majority of the respondents, 66 percent of them, supported the membership of BiH into NATO, while 26 percent of them were against, and 8 percent were undecided. However, just like the case with the K-Serbs in Kosovo, the Serbs living in Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) in BiH object to the NATO integration of the country. Accordingly, 52 percent of them do not support BiH’s membership into NATO, while 37 percent of them have answered that BiH should become a member of NATO, and 10 percent of them were undecided (Foreign Policy Initiative BH, 2012). Similar to Kosovo’s comparison with the other cases of the countries of the Western Balkans, Kosovo and BiH differ quite a lot from each other in terms of their path to NATO integration. The latter joined the PfP in 2006, and after two years it has been involved in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO, and in 2010, NATO invited BiH to join the MAP once the condition on registration of immovable defence property has been met (NATO, 2014i).

Therefore, it can be concluded that NATO integration is not linked directly or indirectly with the public support of citizens for the process. To the contrary, it proves that the long process of integration into NATO is a rather political process which is followed by the fulfilment of certain conditions by a country aspiring to join NATO. However, if Kosovo’s integration process in NATO is extensively prolonged, there is a risk that the perceptions of the Kosovo citizens towards NATO integration could change, with less citizens supporting Kosovo’s membership into NATO. The continued high degree of support by Kosovo citizens towards NATO integration cannot be guaranteed to be continually demonstrated with Kosovo outside of the enlargement process in the long term. Considering this, NATO should reconsider its current relations with Kosovo and move forward towards establishing contractual relations with the Kosovo institutions.
SECTION 3 – POLICY OPTIONS ON THE PROSPECT OF KOSOVO-NATO RELATIONS

This research has found that there are internal and external impediments on Kosovo's membership into NATO. Therefore, the KCSS aims to provide options, suggestions, and alternatives in regard to the ways in which Kosovo can move forward. Policy options are expected to serve as recommendations for the Kosovo institutions to begin official cooperation with NATO and introduce contractual relations with NATO that would serve its path towards the integration process and full membership. The inability of Kosovo’s institutions to deal with Kosovo’s integration in NATO, and the political disadvantages created by the issue of non-recognition by four NATO member countries, represent two key challenges that Kosovo must approach with more urgency.

In addition, once Kosovo achieves contractual relations with NATO and applies for its membership, it will have to be involved in the fulfillment of NATO membership conditions. These conditions include: (i) functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; (ii) fair treatment of minority populations; (iii) commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; (iv) the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and (v) commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures (NATO, 2014h). Kosovo is in the process of meeting these conditions, despite the political impediments that are blocking Kosovo from initiating contractual relations with NATO.

The following options offer policy alternatives on how to move ahead with improving Kosovo-NATO relations, through shaping new policies with the Kosovo institutions to officially start membership procedures for the PfP and NATO.

3.1. First scenario: From Kosovo-NATO dialogue to full membership

Pursuant to the ideas of the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who for the first time mentioned that the structural and formal dialogue between Kosovo and NATO is possible and can be further developed between both parties, the Kosovo institutions should both reflect on and consider it. They should ask explicitly for NATO’s NAC to launch a formal dialogue with Kosovo. As such, it has to be strictly limited on time, not more than two years, with the main task to prepare Kosovo to participate and gain membership in PfP and consequently NATO itself. In October 2014, the then Acting Minister of the KSF, Agim Çeku, has revealed details on what this dialogue may look like; a dialogue that would lead to the establishment of formal and official relations between Kosovo and NATO. Once the KAF is established, and a legislation package is adopted by the Kosovo Assembly, according to Çeku, then the NATO Working Group (NWG) within the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo (OPMK) shall be responsible to prepare a plan called a Presentation Document (Çeku, 2014). Afterwards the Kosovo Government, more precisely Kosovo’s MFA, will have to submit such a document to the NATO authorities by asking to formally initiate the Kosovo-NATO dialogue.

The dialogue should start with an agreement on mutually acceptable solutions between Kosovo and NATO on the role of KFOR in Kosovo and an assessment of this mission on the ground. It should comprise of a request to decrease the number of KFOR troops, slowly resulting in the handing over
of its responsibilities to the KAF and KP, in particular including responsibilities regarding the Decani Monastery and Kosovo borders with Serbia in the northern and eastern part of Kosovo. The formal and structural Kosovo-NATO dialogue should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the KFOR mission in Kosovo by NATO in cooperation with the Kosovo institutions. KFOR’s main responsibility to ensure a safe and secure environment in Kosovo should be handed over gradually to the KAF in compliance with the progress Kosovo will mark in the NATO integration process. Furthermore, the KAF have to work closely with KFOR to gradually take responsibilities from KFOR. Knowing that KFOR’s mandate derived by the Resolution 1244 of the UN which is not yet abrogated, following the KAF’s establishment the former should develop its human and operational capabilities which indirectly would make the role of KFOR’s mission in Kosovo unnecessary in front of the NATO member countries. Consequently, the KAF’s importance would increase and may lead to the assumption of responsibilities from KFOR to guarantee a safe and secure environment in the country. Additionally, it would open the way for Kosovo and its institutions to officially start the NATO membership process. However, prior to KFOR’s withdrawal, a process of border demarcation is required to take place between Kosovo and Serbia under either EU or NATO mediation. Such an agreement, which the KCSS considers to be possible, would lead towards the long-term peace and stability in the Western Balkans region which is a key step towards normalizing relations and Euro-Atlantic integration processes for both Kosovo and Serbia.

In addition, it is required that NATO merge its contribution of NAT and NLAT which should be transformed into a single mission, possibly in the form of a NATO Liaison Office in Kosovo (NLOK). The NLOK shall be independent from KFOR, and its key responsibility should focus on supporting the KSF, or the forthcoming KAF, but, at the same time it should not be limited to this. Its mission should have a further political dimension in order to assist, support, and prepare Kosovo’s membership into NATO. Also, it should advise and assist the Kosovo institutions in its path towards NATO membership and, compared to KFOR’s mandate, the NLOK would stay in Kosovo until the latter becomes a full NATO member. On the other hand, after the formal and structural dialogue with NATO is established, the Kosovo institutions expect that NATO appoints a Special Representative who will have a political mandate to represent NATO in Kosovo (Çeku, 2014). The NATO Special Representative in Kosovo (NSRK) should work closely, in particular with Kosovo’s MFA on issues regarding the formal and structural dialogue between Kosovo and NATO. Also, the NSRK would cooperate with the NLOK in order to help Kosovo on its way to NATO membership and, at the same time, it would assume the task to coordinate on all matters in regards to Kosovo-NATO relations. According to the Kosovo Government’s senior officials, the re-establishment of the NLOK and the appointment of the NSRK by NATO in Kosovo are likely to occur during 2015; however, this does not mean that the Kosovo policymakers should continue to expect the form of NATO decision. They should establish the NWG as soon as possible, prepare and submit the Presentation Document to the NAC and to all NATO member countries, which should eventually lead to the launching of a Kosovo-NATO formal dialogue.

The final objective of the formal dialogue between Kosovo and NATO should be the signing of a bilateral agreement between the two parties; which would eventually lead to Kosovo entering into a contractual dialogue with NATO. The agreement should be based on the similar modality used in EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, meaning that NATO’s NRCs would not block the progress made in the dialogue, and that NATO would commit to Kosovo’s membership.
Furthermore, it should enable the participation of the KAF in NATO operations, as well as in the NATO international peacekeeping mission. The agreement should also guarantee that Kosovo will receive NATO’s IPAP, including the integral element of the Intensified Dialogue and in which countries wishing to join NATO are invited to undertake and implement relevant reforms. Afterwards, the agreement between Kosovo and NATO should assure that the membership process towards PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is opened, with the fulfilment of the required conditions for joining these programmes which would the responsibility of the Kosovo institutions. However, any decision on the PfP membership will be subject to the consent of all NATO member countries given that any decision on this matter is taken with consensus. Nonetheless, it is the success of the formal and structural dialogue as well as Kosovo’s full membership in PfP that will it ultimately open the door for Kosovo to be invited to participate in the MAP as the final step to meet obligations for membership in NATO.
STAGE 1:
MFA should submit Kosovo’s Presentation Document to NATO

- Launching of Kosovo-NATO formal dialogue shall clearly provide:
- NATO shall decide to:

STAGE 2:
Bilateral Agreement between Kosovo and NATO

- After the completion of dialogue, the agreement shall provide:

2. Development of the KAF’s human and operational capabilities that may lead to the assumption of main responsibilities from KFOR to guarantee a safe and secure environment in Kosovo.
3. Border demarcation between Kosovo and Serbia under EU or NATO mediation.

1. Establishment of contractual relations between Kosovo and NATO;
2. Starting of NATO membership process;
3. NATO shall pave the way for Kosovo towards PfP and NATO membership;
4. The NATO’s NRCs will not block Kosovo’s membership in NATO;
5. KAF’s participation in NATO operations and international missions;

Figure 3: First scenario - From Kosovo-NATO dialogue to full membership
3.2. Second scenario: Bilateral cooperation with NATO countries

If the first scenario fails, the Kosovo institutions should be prepared for another which focuses more on deepening bilateral cooperation with the individual NATO member countries. As long as Kosovo is blocked by the NATO’s NRCs and prevents the former in establishing contractual relations with NATO, Kosovo has to find other alternatives to approach NATO through close cooperation with NATO countries.

The Kosovo institutions, more precisely the MKSF, or the forthcoming MoD, just like it has already done with some NATO members, jointly with the MFA, should insist on reaching bilateral agreements with other NATO members including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Turkey and other NATO member countries. The existing and upcoming bilateral agreements should be focused on training programmes and joint exercises of the KAF with the armed forces of these respective NATO countries. Also, the KAF should be prepared with regards to participation in international peacekeeping operations. Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries can help with the development of the capabilities of the KAF according to the NATO standards of interoperability. In this regard, it is very important for the Kosovo institutions to follow the best examples and successful stories of countries that have previously joined NATO. Kosovo’s MFA as well as the MKSF, or the forthcoming MoD, should sign bilateral agreements with the line ministries of Albania and Croatia so as to benefit directly from their cases of joining PfP and NATO. Apart from this, the Kosovo institutions should be tasked to view and study the MAP of Montenegro and Macedonia.

Once Kosovo has reached bilateral agreements with individual countries in NATO, it should be far easier for the Kosovo institutions to adopt and fulfil NATO’s membership conditions until the political impediments of NATO integration are exceeded. Additionally, the Kosovo institutions, in this case the KAF, may unilaterally fulfil conditions and standards required for NATO membership. In doing so, Kosovo, to some extent, will be prepared when it comes to an application for membership in the PfP programme and NATO itself. At the same time, bilateral cooperation should ensure that Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries will support the unilateral implementation and fulfilment of NATO standards by the Kosovo institutions. An alternative scenario to membership of NATO is also important to consider, through cooperation between Kosovo institutions including the Government, MFA and MKSF, or the forthcoming MoD, at all stages, resulting in stronger cooperation with friendly NATO member countries.

The Kosovo Government, specifically the MKSF, or the forthcoming MoD, and the MFA, should increase the number of Kosovo’s Defence Attaches to the diplomatic missions of Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries. It would deepen further security, defence and diplomatic relations with these countries. Furthermore, the MFA should bear in mind the idea to expand and increase the number of diplomatic staff in the NATO member countries, specifically in the U.S., the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey and other countries. The overseas embassies of Kosovo working in close cooperation with Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries should aim to influence the NATO’s NRCs to soften their stance on Kosovo’s independence.

Bearing in mind that this scenario is less favourable than the first one with respect to NATO integration, however, institutions in Kosovo responsible for dealing with NATO integration should exhaust all possibilities unless the country gets the green light to enter into contractual relations with NATO.
**Strengthening of cooperation with NATO member countries**

1. The Kosovo Government should reach more bilateral agreements with other NATO countries.

2. The Kosovo Government should sign bilateral agreements with Albania and Croatia so as to benefit directly from their cases of joining PfP and NATO.

3. The Kosovo Government should be tasked to view and study the Membership Action Plan of Montenegro and Macedonia.

**Diplomatic efforts**

1. The Kosovo institutions may unilaterally fulfil conditions required for NATO membership. Thus, Kosovo will be prepared when it comes to an application for membership in the PfP programme and NATO itself.

2. Bilateral cooperation should ensure that Kosovo’s friendly NATO countries will support the unilateral implementation and fulfilment of NATO standards by Kosovo.

3. Embassies of Kosovo working in close cooperation with NATO countries should aim to influence the NATO’s NRCs to soften their stance on Kosovo’s independence.

Bilateral agreements should be focused on training programmes and joint exercises of the KAF with the armed forces of respective NATO countries.

Kosovo’s friendly NATO countries can help with the development of the capabilities of the KAF according to the NATO standards of interoperability.

**Figure 4: Second scenario - Bilateral cooperation with NATO countries**
RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Kosovo institutions:

- A NATO Working Group should be established by the Prime Minister of Kosovo. There is an immediate need for the policymakers of Kosovo to undertake reforms in the institutional framework so as to put into practice the objective of developing the Kosovo-NATO contractual relations as well as obligations and steps needed to follow for NATO membership (for more details, see Table 1).

- Kosovo’s diplomacy should be brought into action and be more proactive in working with its friendly NATO member countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, France and other countries to influence the four non-recognizing countries of NATO to change their stance on Kosovo’s status.

- The Kosovo institutions should seek to start an official dialogue with NATO which would be limited in duration and to some extent would prepare Kosovo for the Partnership for Peace programme and for further required steps on NATO’s membership (see the first scenario).

- The Kosovo institutions should seek to open a Liaison Office of Kosovo in NATO Headquarters in Brussels until Kosovo officially gets the right to send its permanent liaison officer to NATO Headquarters within the Partnership for Peace Programme and to establish its Permanent Representation at NATO Headquarters.

- Senior representatives of the Kosovo institutions should have more frequent visits and meetings in NATO with its Secretary General as well as with representatives of NATO member countries.

- Kosovo should deepen and strengthen bilateral cooperation with individual NATO member countries through the following actions:

  - The Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, or the forthcoming Ministry of Defence, should reach bilateral agreements with individual NATO member countries, especially with those where there is no such agreement, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and others. Additionally, the focus should be on implementing the existing agreements. They can be very useful and Kosovo can benefit on its path to join NATO.

  - Through bilateral cooperation with those countries, Kosovo should start applying, fulfilling and implementing unilaterally the conditions and standards required for Partnership for Peace and NATO integration.

  - In order to strengthen relations with NATO countries in terms of security, defence and support on Kosovo’s NATO integration, the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, or the forthcoming Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs should increase the number of Kosovo’s Defence Attaches to the diplomatic missions of Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries.

  - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take into account the possibility to increase the number of Kosovo’s diplomatic staff in the NATO member countries, specifically in Kosovo’s embassies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey and other countries.
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, or the forthcoming Ministry of Defence, should sign bilateral agreements with the line ministries of Albania and Croatia with the view to benefit from their examples with regards to Partnership for Peace and NATO integration. Kosovo should follow and learn lessons from the successful NATO membership attainment of these countries.

• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, or the forthcoming Ministry of Defence as well as the forthcoming NATO Working Group and Department for NATO and Security Policy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be tasked to view and study the Membership Action Plan of Montenegro and Macedonia in order to be prepared when it comes to the official application on NATO membership.

- Kosovo and its institutions should begin cooperation with NATO’s non-recognizing countries through intensified dialogue in multilateral meetings at regional level that would mark the initial phase of cooperation between Kosovo and these countries.

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should pursue the United States and other Western Balkan countries to not block Kosovo’s full membership in and recognition by the Adriatic Charter.

- Membership of Kosovo in NATO is not a matter of timeframes. The Kosovo politicians should not give empty promises as to when the country can join NATO. NATO integration does not depend only from the Kosovo institutions, but it is also subject to decisions made by consensus within NATO and among its member countries.

**To the forthcoming Kosovo Armed Forces:**

• As the future army of Kosovo, the Kosovo Armed Forces should be able to assume security tasks with the respect to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kosovo.

• In reaching its capabilities to be responsible for the safety and security of the Kosovo citizens and territory, the Kosovo Armed Forces should be ready to assume tasks from KFOR given the latter will not stay in Kosovo inevitably.

• The Kosovo Armed Forces should be trained professionally in order to be ready for participation in international peacekeeping operations. The relevant institutions involved in the Kosovo Armed Forces should undertake the necessary defence policy based on the NATO conditions in order to set up modern armed forces. In doing so they should work closely with NATO for the inter-operability of the Kosovo Armed Forces.

**To NATO and Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries:**

- Four NATO member countries – Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – should recognize Kosovo straight away. They do not have adequate reasons in their stand to not recognize Kosovo as the case of Kosovo’s independence is unique, sui generis and consequently cannot be a precedent for other countries to declare independence. Furthermore, by taking a decision to recognize Kosovo, those countries would contribute in the long-term peace and stability in the Western Balkans as well as it would finally pave the way for Kosovo towards NATO integration.
- Kosovo's friendly NATO member countries should support Kosovo on influencing the four non-recognizing countries of NATO to change their stance on the independence of Kosovo.

- NATO should consider launching the Kosovo-NATO formal and structural dialogue (see the first scenario). NATO's decision-making structures should take an official decision:
  - To launch the dialogue between Kosovo and NATO that would lead to paving Kosovo's path towards the Partnership for Peace and NATO membership.
  - To merge the two NATO teams in Kosovo into the NATO Liaison Office in Kosovo and to appoint the NATO Special Representative in Kosovo who will be in charge of conducting the formal and structural dialogue with the Kosovo institutions.

- It should conduct an assessment of the KFOR mission in Kosovo by NATO in cooperation with the Kosovo institutions. KFOR's main responsibility to ensure a safe and secure environment in Kosovo should be handed over gradually to the Kosovo Armed Forces in compliance with the progress Kosovo will mark in the NATO integration process. Furthermore, the Kosovo Armed Forces have to work closely with KFOR to gradually take responsibilities from KFOR. Knowing that KFOR's mandate derived by the Resolution 1244 of the United Nations which is not yet abrogated, following the Kosovo Armed Forces' establishment the former should develop its human and operational capabilities which indirectly would make the role of KFOR's mission in Kosovo unnecessary before the NATO member countries. Consequently, the Kosovo Armed Forces' importance would increase and may lead to the assumption of responsibilities from KFOR to guarantee a safe and secure environment in the country.

- NATO should develop, train and assist the capacity-building of defence of the Kosovo Armed Forces according to the NATO programme of inter-operability. Furthermore, NATO should assist in the professional development of the Kosovo Armed Forces as well as assisting the Ministry of Defence on exercising civilian and democratic control over the Kosovo Armed Forces.

- Kosovo's friendly NATO member countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey and others should help with the development of the capabilities of the Kosovo Armed Forces.
Table 1: Kosovo’s institutional framework vis-à-vis NATO integration

Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo (OPMK)

KSC is not involved directly when it comes to Kosovo-NATO relations and does not have any specific responsibilities in this field. Its role is mainly advisory: it reviews the foreign security policy of Kosovo, drafts all treaties and international agreements relevant to security, and establishes relations between national security agencies and foreign counterpart agencies or organizations (Kosovo Government, 2014, p. 23).

However, KSC should be engaged directly on the occasion of Kosovo’s membership process towards NATO. SSSR has not foreseen any duty for the KSC in this regard, but its role should be reconsidered by the Kosovo Government.

NATO Working Group (NWG)

NWG will have to be established immediately after the establishment of the KAF (Çeku, 2014). Its main focus will be on developing recommendations, ideas, and actions that the Kosovo Government can initiate to improve its relationship with NATO, as well as to put Kosovo on the path towards participation in PfP program with the ultimate goal for NATO membership (Kosovo Government, 2014, p. 57).

However, it is insubstantial for the NWG to be established as an institutional body under the OPMK. Instead of this, SSSR should be reviewed and therefore NWG will have to function as a working group within the KSC. Furthermore, as to who leads the NWG should be revised since currently it is foreseen that the Minister of Defence leads it, while on the other hand Kosovo’s representation and membership to international organization, namely in NATO, is a responsibility of the MFA. The latter has a leading role in the related matter while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has mainly an operational role in the relations with NATO. The Kosovo Government should review organizational structure of NWG, as a result.

National Security Advisor of the Prime Minister

National Security Advisor is responsible to advise the Prime Minister on the policies related to security on internal and external issues. Knowing that until 2014 the relations with NATO have not been of an utmost priority for the Kosovo Government in particular as well as for other institutions in general, the role of the Advisor should be strengthened more in providing the policy recommendations of an eventual Kosovo-NATO cooperation.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

The DNSP has been established in 2013 with the aim to prepare the necessary policy documents towards NATO integration. The DNSP is responsible for coordinating and supervising relations with NATO member states as well as coordinating and overseeing foreign policy, with regards to increasing consensus and support from member countries for Kosovo’s path toward integration in Euro-Atlantic structures (MFA, 2014).

Nevertheless, as a body within the MFA, the DNSP has not achieved its objective in producing related documents concerning NATO integration (Ahmeti, 2014). As a matter of fact, it is critical to mention that the MFA does not have a plan on how to proceed with issues affecting cooperation and relations of Kosovo with NATO.

The DNSP should be very careful in coordinating every step with the NWG regarding membership process into NATO, especially when the NWG is established. Any possible confusion between the DNSP and the NWG should be avoided. Both of them should have specific tasks and their role needs to be specified for carrying out duties concerning NATO integration in particular and in producing documents and preparing the country for membership into NATO.
Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF)

The MKSF is accountable for exercising civilian control over the KSF, in both management and administration. In addition, it is comprised of a mixture of civilian and military personnel and is accountable to the Kosovo Assembly (MKSF, 2014b). With the aim to fulfill its mission, the MKSF is supported by NATO. More precisely, NATO has continuously assisted in establishing NAT’s team which is a civilian-led organization aiming to supervise and control the KSF. KFOR is tasked to support NAT (NATO, 2014a). The latter is located at the MKSF offices.

Kosovo Security Force (KSF)

The KSF has made substantial progress since its establishment in 2009. It is built with direct NATO’s assistance and supervision in all areas including recruitment, training, as well as in enrolling all ethnic communities in the KSF. In 2013, the KSF has reached Full Operational Capability (FOC), which was declared by NATO’s NAC on 9 July 2013 (NATO, 2013a). According to the senior officials of the KSF, the latter has fulfilled 132 conditions set by NATO in order to reach the FOC (Kastrati, 2014). However, even after the FOC was reached, the KSF role has remained the same, mainly in conducting civil protection operations and assisting the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies. Furthermore, the KSF is involved in conducting non-military security functions that are not applicable for the police as well as it deals with search and rescue operations, explosive ordinance disposal, control and clearance of hazardous materials, fire-fighting and other humanitarian assistance tasks (NATO, 2013b).

Following the FOC by the KSF, NATO has continued to provide advice and support in the development of the KSF by establishing the NLAT in Pristina which is distinct from KFOR’s mission. It is made up of approximately 30 military and civilian personnel to help the professional development of the KSF. NLAT is deemed to support the KAF at brigade level and above, with a particular emphasis on staff capacity-building and training (NATO, 2013b).

For the first time, in 2014, some of the KSF officers conducted a military training at NATO’s schools in Germany and Poland with a particular focus on education programme of the resource management and planning. As a result of the bilateral agreements between the MKSF and the MoD of some NATO and non-NATO member countries, a number of the KSF members have been sent abroad for education and bilateral trainings including the U.S., Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Albania and other countries (MKSF, 2014, pp. 22-23).

In 2013 and 2014 the MKSF and Kosovo’s MFA appointed six Defence Attachés in the following embassies of Kosovo: Washington (U.S.), Brussels (Belgium), Berlin (Germany), Ankara (Turkey), Tirana (Albania) and Stockholm (Sweden) (MKSF, 2014, p. 22). Out of the six countries where the Defence Attachés have been appointed, five of them, except Sweden, are NATO member countries. However, the Kosovo Government should increase the number of Defence Attachés to other Kosovo’s friendly NATO member countries.
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